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Abstract 
 
 
In a model of career concerns for experts, when is the principal hurt from observing 
more information about her agent? This paper introduces a distinction between 
information on the consequence of the agent's action and information directly on the 
agent's action. It is the latter kind that can hurt the principal by engendering 
conformism, which worsens both discipline and sorting. The paper identifies a 
necessary and sufficient condition on the agent signal structure under which 
transparency on action is detrimental to the principal. The paper also shows the 
existence of complementarities between transparency on action and transparency on 
consequence. The results are used to interpret existing disclosure policies in politics, 
corporate governance, and delegated portfolio management. 
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1 Introduction
There is a widespread perception, especially among economists, that transparency is a beneficial
element in agency relationships because more information about the agent makes the agent more
accountable to the principal. This perception has been confirmed by theoretical results (e.g.
Holmström [15]) and is consistent with empirical evidence (e.g. Besley and Burgess [2] in politics
and Dyck and Zingales [9] in corporate governance).
This would lead one to conclude that transparency ought to be the governing principle in
agency relations. Whenever it is technologically feasible and not extremely expensive, the prin-
cipal should observe everything that the agent does. However, as we shall argue, in practice we
observe systematic deviations from transparency in important agency relationships in politics,
corporate governance, and delegated portfolio management.
In politics, the principle of open government has made great inroads in the last decades but
there are still important areas in which public decision-making is, by law, protected by secrecy.
In the United States, the “executive privilege” allows the president to withhold information from
the Congress, the courts, and the public (Rozell [30]). While the executive privilege cannot be
used arbitrarily and fell in disrepute during the Watergate scandal, the Supreme Court recognized
its validity (US vs. Nixon, 1974). In the European Union, the most powerful legislative body, the
Council, has a policy of holding meetings behind closed doors and not publishing the minutes
(Calleo [4]). Over thirty countries have passed Freedom of Information Acts, which establish
the principle that a citizen should be able to access any public document. There are, however,
important types of information, such as pre-decision material, that are often exempt from this
requirement (Frankel [14]).1
In corporate governance, violations to the transparency principle are so widespread that some
legal scholars argue that secrecy is the norm rather than the exception in the relation between
stakeholders and managers (Stevensons [33, p. 6]): “Corporations — even the largest among them
— have always been treated by the legal system as ‘private’ institutions. When questions about
the availability of corporate information have arisen, the inquiry has typically begun from the
premise that corporations, like individuals, are entitled to keep secret all information they are
able to secure physically unless some particular reason for disclosure [...] could be adduced in
support of a contrary rule. So deeply embedded in our world view is this principle that it is not
at all uncommon to hear serious discussions of a corporate ‘right to privacy’.”
In delegated portfolio management, investors have typically limited information on the com-
position of the fund they own. Currently, the US Securities and Exchange Commission requires
disclosure every six-months (a snapshot of the fund holdings). It would be easy and almost
1Section 7 returns to these non-disclosure policies and re-interprets them in the context of the present model.
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costless to have more frequent disclosure by requiring mutual funds to publicize their portfolio
composition on the internet. Yet, there is strong resistance from the industry to proposals in the
direction of more frequent disclosure (Tyle [34]).
What are the reasons behind this observed lack of transparency?2 One obvious candidate
explanation is that information revealed to the principal would also be revealed to a third party
who will make use of it in ways that hurt the principal. In the political arena, voters may choose
to ignore information pertaining to national security to prevent hostile countries from learning
them as well. In the corporate world, shareholders may wish to keep non-patentable information
secret rather than risk that the competitors learn it. In delegated portfolio management, real
time disclosure could damage a fund because its investment strategy could be mimicked or even
anticipated by competitors.3
The “third-party rationale” for keeping information secret presumably entails a tradeoﬀ be-
tween damage from information leaks and weaker incentives for the agent. This paper is instead
concerned with a rationale for secrecy that stems purely from incentive considerations. The
conjecture is that in some circumstances revealing more information about the agent makes the
agent’s interest less aligned with the principal’s interest.
This paper uses a model of career concerns for experts (Scharfstein and Stein [32], Prendergast
and Stole [29], Ottaviani and Sørensen [25]). The main idea is that what diﬀerentiates a good
agent from a bad agent is his ability to understand the state of the world, which can be interpreted
as expertise, intelligence, or vision. Expert models have been used to represent phenomena in
the three fields from which we draw examples: politics, corporate governance, and delegated
portfolio management.
There are two periods: the current period and the future period. In the current period, an
agent (the expert) is in charge of taking an action on behalf of the principal. The agent has no
intrinsic preferences among possible actions, ie there is no moral hazard in a classical sense. The
agent receives a signal about the state of the world, whose precision depends on the agent’s type.
The action, together with the state of the world, determines a consequence for the principal. At
the end of the current period, the principal forms a posterior about the agent’s type, based on
information available, and she decides whether to keep the current agent or replace him with
2We focus on normative explanations. Obviously there is also a positive explanation. Transparency is indeed
the optimal policy but the existing institutions are suboptimal. The status quo persists perhaps because of the
entrenched interests of the current agents or because of the inertia of complex institutional arrangements. If the
positive explanation is correct, it is then essential to make the case in favor of transparency as strong as possible
by studying the validity of potential objections to the transparency principle. The present paper may be seen as
a contribution in that sense.
3However, the SEC proposed reform allows for a time lag — usually sixty days — that is judged to be suﬃcient
to neutralize free riding and front running.
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another, randomly drawn, agent. In the future period, the agent who is in charge faces a similar
decision problem. The wage of the agent cannot be made contingent on the agent’s current
performance. The agent maximizes the probability of keeping his job. The principal cares about
the consequence in the current period (discipline component) and the consequence in the second
period, which in turn depends on the ability of the principal to screen agents by type (sorting
component).
We distinguish between two kinds of information that the principal can observe: information
about the action that the agent took and information about the consequence of the agent’s action.
Suppose for now that the principal always observes the consequence but may or may not observe
the action (and that a consequence can be generated by more than one action-state pair, so the
principal cannot retrieve the action from the consequence). More information about the action
can hurt the principal.4
To understand this, first note that, even if the principal knows the consequence of the agent’s
action perfectly, she still stands to gain from knowing the action because knowing which particular
action-state pair has generated the observed consequence helps the principal understand the
agent’s type. Direct information on the agent’s action thus has a potential positive sorting eﬀect.
This eﬀect, however, is based on the assumption that the agent’s behavior is constant, but clearly
an agent who realizes that his action is going to be observed faces a diﬀerent incentive structure.
A crucial observation is that, in a generic model, the possible realizations of the agent’s signal can
be ranked in order of smartness, that is, according to the posterior on the agent’s type given the
realization of the signal. Good agents are more likely than bad agents to receive smart signals. If
in equilibrium the agent’s action is informative of his signal, then also all the possible actions can
be ranked in order of smartness. The posterior on the agent’s type depends on the consequence
but also on the smartness of the action. This creates a contradiction. If the smartness component
is too strong, the only possible equilibrium is one in which actions cannot be ranked in order of
smartness, i.e. an uninformative equilibrium. The agent disregards his private signal and acts in
a purely conformist way. If this is the case, the principal is clearly better oﬀ committing to keep
the action concealed.
This leads to a necessary and suﬃcient condition under which revealing the agent’s action
leads to conformism. The condition has to do with the relative smartness of the realizations of the
4This is not the first work to show that in career concerns models the principal may want to commit not to
observe certain types of information (see the section on Related Literature). For instance, in Holmström’s [16]
seminal paper better a priori information about the agent’s type reduces the agent’s incentive to exert eﬀort (more
information worsens discipline but it clearly improves sorting). One contribution of this paper is to find one
kind of disclosure that is detrimental to both discipline and sorting. Also, the mechanism through which action
transparency generates its negative eﬀect is through misreporting rather than slacking.
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agent’s signal. If one realization is much more smart than the others, then the chain of negative
eﬀects describe above takes place and there are only conformist equilibria. In mathematical
terms, the condition is expressed as a bound on the relative informativeness of the diﬀerent
realizations of the agent’s signal. This condition implies that the more advantageous it is for the
principal to commit to concealment ex ante, the more advantageous it is for her to renege on her
commitment ex post and observe the agent’s action for sorting purposes.
We also show that there is a complementarity between transparency on action and trans-
parency on consequence. The optimal probability that action is observed is nondecreasing in the
probability that the consequence is observed. This is because an agent who pretends to have
observed the smart realization by playing the action corresponding to the smart realization has a
lower probability of obtaining a good consequence than an agent who actually observed the smart
realization. Thus the cost of pretending to have observed the smart realization is increasing in
the probability that consequence is observed.
The plan of the paper is as follows. The main argument is developed in a simplified en-
vironment in which there are two states of the world, two actions, two consequences, and two
realizations of the agent signal. This allows for a full characterization of the equilibrium set,
which in turn leads to precise welfare results. Later in the paper, we study a very general model
and we prove extended versions of some results obtained in the binary model. Section 2 in-
troduces the baseline career concern game and shows how it can be interpreted as the reduced
form of two economic situations. Section 3 contains the analysis of the baseline model. We first
present a simple example in which revealing the agent’s action generates complete conformism
to the detriment of discipline and sorting. We characterize the set of perfect Bayesian equilibria
under the two information scenarios: concealed action and revealed action. The characterization
is then used to perform a welfare analysis. Section 4 studies the complementarity between action
observation and consequence observation. Section 5 allows the agent to know know his own type
or have at least some information about it. Section 6 analyzes the general version of the model.
Section 7 concludes by using the results of the paper to interpret some existing institutional
arangements in politics, corporate governance, and delegated portfolio management.
1.1 Related literature
There are many works that are somehow related to how agency relationships are aﬀected by
changes in the underlying information structure. In “classical” moral hazard principal-agent
problems, the question has been resolved by Holmström [15]. Observing an additional signal can
never hurt the principal and it is strictly beneficial if and only if the principal does not already
observe a signal that is a suﬃcient statistic for the additional signal.
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On the contrary, the literature on career concerns has already several examples in which more
information about the agent’s behavior hurts the principal. There are three main approaches
to model career concerns, depending on whether the agent’s type is seen as ability to exert
eﬀort (Holmström [16]), congruence of preference with the principal (the multi-period version of
Crawford and Sobel [6]), or ability to observe a signal about the state of the world (see references
below). In the first approach, actions are costly from the point of view of the agents and the
ones that are more beneficial to the principal are more costly for the agent. The second and
third approaches typically give rise to cheap talk models, in which the agent faces no direct cost
when he takes an action (obviously, the agent can face an indirect cost through the reaction of
the principal).
For the first approach, Holmström [16] already provides an example of one kind of information
that worsens discipline. If the principal has more prior information about the agent’s type, the
agent has less incentive to work hard in the current period to signal his type. When one focuses
attention to information about the agent’s performance, rather than the agent’s type, the question
of comparing information structures is studied in a general way by Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole
[8]. They first present two examples in which a more precise signal about the agent’s performance
reduces discipline. They then find general suﬃcient conditions under which an additional signal
increases eﬀort.
Not unrelated to the first approach is Crémer [7], who studies optimal transparency when
contracts are renegotiable. He shows that, in a two-period agency model where renegotiation is
possible, the principal may be hurt by a decrease in the cost of observing the agent’s performance.
This is because improving the ex post information of the principal makes a commitment not to
renegotiate less credible.
None of the papers in the first approach present examples in which more information worsens
both discipline and sorting. There appears to be a trade-oﬀ between discipline and sorting. For
instance, in Holmström [16] knowing the agent’s type destroys eﬀort exertion but makes screening
trivial. In the model that is used in the present paper there is no eﬀort exertion and the rationale
behind the potentiallly negative eﬀect of transparency in entirely diﬀerent.
For the second approach, the question of comparing information structures is briefly discussed
by Morris [22, p 18-19]. There, an agent observes a signal about the state of the world and makes
a report to the principal. The principal makes a decision after hearing the agent’s report. Then,
the state of the world is revealed. A market then forms a posterior on the basis of the agent’s
report and on the observation of the state. Morris compares this situation with the situation in
which the market observes neither the signal nor the state (because principals are short-lived).
He shows that observing the state and the signal improves sorting and may improve or worsens
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the current period decision: while the bad type’s decision is more aligned with the principal’s
preference, the good type may be induced to take an extreme action to separate himself from
the bad type (the “political correctness” eﬀect).5
The third approach — the expert agent model (Scharfstein and Stein [32], Zwiebel [35], Pren-
dergast and Stole [29], Ottaviani and Sørensen [24] [25], Levy [19]) — is the one that is used here.
To the best of my knowledge, there is no paper in this stream comparing the eﬀect of revealing
diﬀerent kinds of information. It is typically assumed that the principal (or the market) observes
the agent’s action. For instance, in Prendergast and Stole [29], the agent’s action — the invest-
ment decision — is publicly observed, and in Ottaviani and Sørensen [25] the agent’s “action” is
the message that the expert sends to the evaluator and it is, by definition, observed. However,
there are also models, like Zwiebel [35], in which the agent’s action is not observable.6
Two papers present examples in which more information worsens both discipline and sorting.
Prendergast [28] analyzes an agency problem in which the agent exerts eﬀort to observe
a variable which is of interest to the principal. The principal too receives a signal about the
variable and the agent receives a signal about the signal that the principal received. This is not
a career concern model and the principal can oﬀer payments conditional on the agent’s report.
Prendergast shows that the agent uses his information on the principal’s signal to biases his report
toward the principal’s signal. Misreporting on the part of the agent causes a loss of eﬃciency.
Avery and Meyer [1] ask whether in a career concerns for advisors who may be biased (second
approach) it is beneficial from the point of view of principal to keep track of the advisor’s past
recommendations. They argue that in certain circumstances observing past recommendations
worsens discipline and does not improve sorting. Although the setup is quite diﬀerent, the
intuition is similar to the present paper. If the advisor knows that his recommendations aﬀect
his future career prospects, he may have an incentive to pool on one type of recommendation
independently of his private information.7
Ely and Välimäki [11] and Ely, Fudenberg, and Levine [10] ask under what conditions incen-
tives for reputation are bad. Ely and Välimäki construct a model with a long-lived expert who
can be either a strategic type who is good or a commitment type who is bad and they reach the
5Maskin and Tirole [21] use a career concern model of the second kind to explore the issue of the optimal
degree of accountability for public decision-makers. In their model, the principal observes the agent’s choice with
certainty and the consequence of the choice with a certain probability.
6 In Ottaviani and Sorensen [25], it is immaterial to think about the agent’s decision as message transmitted
to the principal or an action taken on behalf of the principal. This is not true anymore in the present model when
the action is not observed.
7Avery and Meyer assume that only the action is observable, not the consequence. The question of whether the
distinction between information on action and information on consequence is crucial also in the second approach
is still open. See Conclusions.
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striking result that an increase in the repution motive (i.e. a lower discount rate for the agent)
reduces the payoﬀs of all players. Ely, Fudenberg, and Levine generalize Ely and Välimäki’s
setup to identify a set of conditions under which the bad eﬀects of reputation arise.
Finally, it is worth mentioning a link with the bargaining literature. Perry and Samuelson
[26] analyze how the outcome of delegated bargaining depends on whether oﬀers are observable to
principals or not. Fingleton and Raith [13] study career concerns for delegated bargaining when
the type of bargainers determine their ability of understanding the opponent’s valuation. They
ask whether bargaining behind closed doors is better or worse from the viewpoint of the principal.
If bargaining occurs secretly, the principal is not able to observe oﬀers but only acceptances. Thus,
also their paper questions the optimality of transparency in expert models. However — besides
the fact that their model is developed in a context of bargaining — their distinction between
acceptance and oﬀer does not correspond to our distinction between consequence and action (if
the oﬀer is accepted, everything is observed).8
2 Model
We first write the agency problem in a detail-free reduced form. We then show how the reduced
form corresponds to two economic situations (“expanded forms”), one in which the bargaining
power is on the principal side, the other in which it is more on the agent side.
The model presented in this section restricts attention to a binary action space, state space,
signal space, and consequence space. Section 6 examines the general case.
2.1 Reduced form
There are a principal and an agent. The agent’s type θ ∈ {g, b} is unknown to both players.
The probability that θ = g is γ ∈ (0, 1) and it is common knowledge. The state of the world is
x ∈ {0, 1} with Pr(x = 1) = p ∈ (0, 1). The random variables x and θ are mutually independent.
The agent selects an action a ∈ {0, 1}. The consequence u (a, x) is 1 if a = x and 0 otherwise.
The principal does not know the state of the world. The agent receives a private signal
y ∈ {0, 1} that depends on the state of the world and on his type. Let qxθ = Pr (y = 1|x, θ). We
assume that
0 < q1g < q1b < q0b < q0g < 1. (1)
This means that the signal is informative (Pr (x = 1|y) is increasing in y and Pr (x = 0|y) is
8See also Seidmann [31] for a complete information model of collective decision making in which a non-disclosure
policy leads to better outcomes.
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decreasing in y) and that the signal is more informative for the better type (Pr (x = y|y, g) >
Pr (x = y|y, b)).
These assumptions alone are not suﬃcient to guarantee that the signal is useful. For instance,
if the prior p on x is very high or very low, it is optimal to disregard y. To make the problem
interesting, we also assume that the signal y is decision-relevant, that is:
(q1gγ + q1b (1− γ)) p+ ((1− q0g) γ + (1− q0b) (1− γ)) (1− p) > max (p, 1− p) . (2)
We can show:
Proposition 1 Condition (2) holds if and only if
Pr (x = 1|y = 1) > Pr (x = 0|y = 1) ,
and
Pr (x = 0|y = 0) > Pr (x = 1|y = 0) .
Proof. We have
Pr (x = 1|y = 1) > Pr (x = 0|y = 1)
(q1gγ + q1b (1− γ)) p > (q0gγ + q0b (1− γ)) (1− p),
yielding
(q1gγ + q1b (1− γ)) p+ ((1− q0g) γ + (1− q0b) (1− γ)) (1− p) > 1− p,
and
Pr (x = 0|y = 0) > Pr (x = 1|y = 0)
((1− q0g) γ + (1− q0b) (1− γ)) (1− p) > ((1− q1g) γ + (1− q1b) (1− γ)) p,
yielding
((1− q0g) γ + (1− q0b) (1− γ)) (1− p) + (q1gγ + q1b (1− γ)) p > p.
The mixed strategy of the agent is a pair α = (α0,α1) ∈ [0, 1]2, which represents the proba-
bility that the agent plays a = 1 given the two possible realizations of the signal.
We consider two cases: concealed action and revealed action. In the first case, the principal
observes only the consequence u. In the second case, she observes also the action a.9
9Section 4 will allow for hybrid disclosure policies, in which the action is observed with a probability ρa and
the consequence is observed with ρu.
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The principal’s posterior probability that the agent’s type is g is π (I), where I is the infor-
mation available to the principal. With concealed action, the posterior is
π˜ (u) = Pr (θ = g|u) = γ Pr (a = x|α, x, θ = g) Pr(x)
Pr (a = x|α, x) Pr(x) .
With revealed action, the principal is able to infer x from a and u. The agent’s posterior,
assuming that a is played in equilibrium with positive probability, is
π (a, x) = Pr (θ = g|a, x) = γ Pr (a, x|θ = g) Pr(x)
Pr (a, x) Pr(x)
.
If action a is not played in equilibrium, perfect Bayesian equilibrium imposes no restriction on
π (a, x).
The payoﬀ to the agent is simply the posterior π (I). The payoﬀ to the principal depends
on the consequence and on the posterior: u (a, x) + v (π (I)), where v is a convex function of π
(as we shall see in the “long forms”, convexity is a natural assumption if the principal uses the
posterior for her hiring and firing decisions). Given any equilibrium strategy α∗, the ex ante
expected payoﬀ of the agent must be γ, while the ex ante expected payoﬀ of the principal is
w (α∗) = Ea,x (u (a, x) + v (π (I)) |α∗). As the agent’s expected payoﬀ does not depend on α∗,
the expected payoﬀ of the principal can also be taken as total welfare.
A perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this game (whether the action is concealed or revealed) is
a mixed-strategy profile (α∗0,α
∗
1) and a posterior π (I) for all possible information sets I, such
that α∗0 is a best-response for an agent with y = 0, α
∗
1 is a best-response for an agent with y = 1,
and π (I) is consistent with Bayesian updating given (α∗0,α
∗
1). We sometimes refer to a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium simply as an “equilibrium”. An equilibrium is informative if α∗0 6= α∗1 and
pooling if α∗0 = α
∗
1. An informative equilibrium are separating if either α
∗
0 = 0 and α
∗
1 = 1 or
α∗0 = 1 and α
∗
1 = 0. An informative equilibrium is semi-separating if it is not separating, ie if at
least one of the two agents uses a mixed strategy. An informative equilibrium is perverse if the
agent chooses the ‘wrong’ action given his signal: α∗0 > α
∗
1.
Let Erevealed and Econcealed be the sets of perfect Bayesian equilibria in the two possible
information scenarios. Given the existence of babbling equilibria, it is clear that the sets are
nonenmpty. Let Wrevealed be the supremum of w (α∗) in Erevealed and let Wconcealed the corre-
sponding value when the action is concealed. The main question that we shall ask is whether
Wrevealed ≥Wconcealed.
Attention should be drawn to two assumptions. First, assuming that the agent maximizes
the posterior π(I), rather than an arbitrary function of the posterior π(I), is not without loss of
generality (see Ottaviani and Sørensen [25] for a discussion of this point). As we shall see, the
assumption is arbitrary in Expanded Form I but it is somewhat more natural in Form II. The
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assumption is made by most papers in career concerns because it makes the analysis simpler.10
Second, the agent does not know his own type (again, Ottaviani and Sørensen [25] discuss
this point). If the agent knew his own type, he could use his action choice as a costly signal of
how confident he is of his own information. Section 5 looks at an extension in this sense.
2.2 Expanded form I: Competing agents.
This form is suited to represent a political game, in which agents are competing parties or
candidates and the principal is the electorate (see Persson and Tabellini [27] for a discussion of
retrospective voting models). In this two-period model, there are two agents and one principal.
One agent, the incumbent, is available in the first period. The other agent, the challenger, appears
at the end of the first period. The type of the incumbent is θ ∈ {g, b}, where the probability
that θ = g is γ. The type of the challenger is θc ∈ {g, b}, where the probability that θ = g is γc.
The principal, as well as the two agents, do not observe the agents types. While γ is known, γc
is itself a stochastic variable with distribution f , which is revealed at the end of the first period.
In the first period, the incumbent is in charge of a binary policy decision a ∈ {0, 1}. The state
of the world is x ∈ {0, 1}. The agent observes a signal y ∈ {0, 1} according to the conditional
probability q described above. We make an additional assumption on q:
q1bp+ (1− q0b) (1− p) > max (p, 1− p) . (3)
This guarantees that, even in the worst-case scenario (when it is learnt that the agent is for
sure a bad type), the signal y is decision-relevant. Condition (3) implies the decision-relevance
condition (2). Without this assumption, it may be the case that second-period eﬃcient decision
making requires choosing the same action independently of the signal.
The consequence u is 1 if the action matches the state and zero otherwise. At the end of the
first period the challenger appears and γc is learnt. The principal observes the consequence, and
possibly the action as well. She then chooses whether to keep the incumbent or replace him with
the challenger.
In the second period, the agent that has been retained faces a decision problem that is similar
to the first period. He selects action aˆ ∈ {0, 1} to match state xˆ ∈ {0, 1}, where the probability
that xˆ = 1 is still p. The agent receives yˆ a signal about xˆ that is distributed according to qyθ
described above. The consequence uˆ is 1 if the action matches the state and zero otherwise.
The payoﬀ to the principal is u+δuˆ, where δ ∈ (0,∞), which captures both the discount rate
and the relative importance of the two periods. A δ > 1 occurs when the second period is more
10See Footnote 16 on page 36 for a discussion of which results are likely to be unaﬀected if one drops the linearity
assumption.
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important than the first. The payoﬀ to each agent is 1 if he is hired for the second period and
zero otherwise (the benefit that the incumbent receives in the first period is normalized to zero).
Clearly, this model describes a world of very incomplete contracts. An agent who is hired gets
a fixed rent that the principal cannot control. In particular, the principal cannot oﬀer transfers
that are conditional on observed performance.
We assume that at the beginning of the first period the interim probability on the challenger’s
type, γc, is uniformally distributed on the unit interval — that is fc is a uniform distribution with
support (0, 1). This restriction guarantees that the payoﬀ of the incumbent is linear in the
posterior.
To summarize, the timing is as follows:
1. The incumbent observes signal y and selects action a.
2. The consequence u is realized. The challenger appears: his prior γc is realized and observed
by all. In the concealed action case, the principal observes u. In the revealed action case,
the principal observes a and u. The principal forms a posterior π on the incumbent’s type
and chooses between the incumbent and the challenger.
3. The agent that has been retained observes signal yˆ and selects action aˆ.
4. The consequence uˆ is realized.
We start by analyzing the two last stages, which are straightforward. In the second period,
the agent that is retained has no career concerns and he is indiﬀerent with regards to the action
he takes. Thus, any strategy is a continuation equilibrium. In line with the rest of the literature
on career concerns, we restrict attention to the continuation equilibrium in which the agent acts
in the interest of the principal. Given (3), independently of his belief on his own type, the agent
selects aˆ = yˆ. Let γˆ be the probability that the agent that is retained for the second period is
good, as computed by the principal at the beginning of the second period (γˆ = π if the incumbent
is confirmed, γˆ = γc if the challenger is hired). The second-period expected utility of the principal
is:
E (uˆ|γˆ) = Pr (yˆ = xˆ|γˆ) = γˆ ((1− p) (1− q0g) + pq1g) + (1− γˆ) ((1− p) (1− q0b) + pq1b)
= (1− p) (1− q0b) + pq1b + γˆ ((1− p) (q0b − q0g) + p (q1g − q1b)) (4)
= Q¯+Qγˆ.
Thus, E (uˆ|γˆ) is linear and increasing in γˆ. The principal chooses to retain the agent with the
higher probability of being a good type. Therefore, γˆ = max{π, γc}, which is a convex function
of π. Thus, the principal’s payoﬀ t is a convex function of π. Then, we have proven that given
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the continuation payoﬀ in the second period, the subgame in the first period can be represented
by the reduced form presented above.
2.3 Expanded form II: Competing principals
This form could be taken as a simple representation of a market for skilled labor. Several firms
compete to hire a worker with a unique talent. If the firms were identical, it would not matter
from an eﬃciency point of view which firm hires the worker. So, to make sorting relevant from
a social viewpoint, we look at an asymmetric setup.
There are three firms (principals), A, B, and C, and one worker (agent). Again, there are
two periods. In the first period there is only principal A. As before a, x, y, and u denote first-
period variables while aˆ, xˆ, yˆ, and uˆ are for the second-period. In the second period, the three
principals compete to hire the agent. A principal who does not hire the agent gets a payoﬀ of
zero. Principals B and C are “small”: they do not incur fixed costs and their payoﬀ is 1 if the
consequence matches the state and zero otherwise. Principal A is “large”. In order to become
active in the first period, she has to pay an upfront cost f ∈ (0, 1). If the action matches the
state she gets 2. Otherwise she gets zero. We also keep assumption (3).
Timing is as follows:
1. The first-period state x is realized. The agent works for Principal A. He observes y and
chooses a.
2. The consequence u is observed by everyone. In the revealed action case, also a is observed.
Each principal makes a wage oﬀer to the agent.
3. The agent chooses one of the three principals. The second-period state x is realized. The
agent observes yˆ and chooses aˆ. The consequence for the principal who hired the agent is
uˆ = 1 if aˆ = xˆ and zero otherwise. If the principal is A, she receives 2uˆ−f . If the principal
is B or C, she receives uˆ.
As before, we focus attention on continuation equilibria in which, whenever indiﬀerent, the
agent chooses his action in order to maximize the payoﬀ of the principal who hired him. In the
second period, the probability that the agents matches the action aˆ to the consequence uˆ is,
similarly to (4), a linear function of the posterior of the agent π: Q¯+Qπ. In the bidding game
at stage 2, Principal A is willing to pay up to 2
¡
Q¯+Qπ
¢
− f , while the other two principals are
willing to pay up to Q¯ + Qπ. Excluding dominated strategies, the equilibrium bid is Q¯ + Qπ.
Principal A hires the agent if and only if
π ≥ f − Q¯
Q
.
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The expected payoﬀ of A given π is max
¡
Q¯+Qπ − f, 0
¢
. Thus, her expected payoﬀ is convex
in the agent’s posterior. The agent’s payoﬀ is instead just the equilibrium bid Q¯+Qπ, and it is
therefore linear in the posterior. Again, given the continuation payoﬀs in the second period, the
first period is strategically equivalent to the reduced form above.
2.4 Smart realization
We introduce a notion that corresponds to a mental experiment. Suppose the principal could
observe the agent signal y directly. Which of the two realizations of the signal y is better news
about the agent type? This corresponds to comparing Pr(θ = 1|y = 1) with Pr(θ = 1|y = 0).
We exclude the nongeneric case in which the two probabilities are identical. In such a sit-
uation, the posterior about the agent must be equal to the prior and the signalling game is
uninsteresting. Pr(θ = 1|y = 1) > Pr(θ = 1|y = 0) we say that y = 1 is the smart realization
of the agent signal. If Pr(θ = 1|y = 1) < Pr(θ = 1|y = 0), we say that y = 0 is the smart
realization. The following result relates smartness to the primitives:
Proposition 2 The smart realization is y = 1 if and only if
q0b − q0g
q1g − q1b
<
p
1− p.
Proof. Note that:
Pr(θ|y) = Pr(y|g) Pr(g)
Pr(y|g) Pr(g) + Pr(y|b) Pr(b)
=
(Pr(y|1, g) Pr(1) + Pr(y|0, g) Pr(0))Pr(g)
(Pr(y|1, g) Pr(1) + Pr(y|0, g) Pr(0))Pr(g) + (Pr(y|1, b) Pr(1) + Pr(y|0, b) Pr(0))Pr(b)
Pr(θ = 1|y = 1) = (q1gp+ q0g (1− p)) γ
(q1gp+ q0g (1− p)) γ + (q1bp+ q0b (1− p)) (1− γ)
Pr(θ = 1|y = 0) = ((1− q1g) p+ (1− q0g) (1− p)) γ
((1− q1g) p+ (1− q0g) (1− p)) γ + ((1− q1b) p+ (1− q0b) (1− p)) (1− γ)
Then, π(y = 1) is greater than π(y = 0) if and only if
(q1gp+ q0g (1− p)) γ
(q1gp+ q0g (1− p)) γ + (q1bp+ q0b (1− p)) (1− γ)
> γ
or
q1gp+ q0g (1− p) > (q1gp+ q0g (1− p)) γ + (q1bp+ q0b (1− p)) (1− γ)
q1gp+ q0g (1− p) > q1bp+ q0b (1− p)
(q1g − q1b) p > (q0b − q0g) (1− p)
q0b − q0g
q1g − q1b
<
p
1− p
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If the two states of the world are equiprobable, Proposition 2 requires that
q1g − q1b > (1− q0g)− (1− q0b).
That is, the diﬀerence between the probability that the good type gets the right signal and the
probabilty that the bad type gets the right signal must be greater if x = 1 than if x = 0. Then,
observing y = 1 raises the agent’s posterior above γ while observing y = 0 decreases it.
If the two states have diﬀerent probability, then the inequality is:
p (q1g − q1b) > (1− p) ((1− q0g)− (1− q0b)) .
3 Analysis
In this section, we begin with a simple example of how revealing the agent’s action generates
conformism. We then analyze separately the concealed action scenario and the revealed action
scenario. We conclude by identifying a necessary and suﬃcient condition on the primitives of the
game under which action revelation is the optimal policy.
3.1 An example
Suppose that γ = 12 , p =
1
2 , q0b = q1b =
1
2 , q0g =
1
2 , and q1g = 1. A bad agent receives an
uninformative signal. A good agent observes the state x = 1 with certainty and gets pure noise
if the state is x = 0. It is easy to check that y = 1 is the smart realization.
This informational setup can be taken to represent a situation in which x = 0 is “business as
usual” and x = 1 is a structural change in the environment. If there is a structural change, ability
matters: only good agents spot the change. If instead the world follows the usual pattern, a good
agent has no informational advantage over a bad agent. In political and corporate governance, this
captures the idea that leadership is tested in turbulent times. In delegated portfolio management,
it corresponds to the notion that what tells a good manager from an mediocre one is the ability
to identify new trends in stock prices.
This asymmetry between signals creates a problem. The signal y = 0 is bad news for the
ability of the agent. More likely than not the agent is one that cannot spot changes in the world.
If the agent reports his signal truthfully, the principal will use it against him. This leads to
conformism: the agent has an incentive to tell the principal that the world has changed whether
or not he actually thinks so.
We now argue that in this example the only equilibrium behavior with revealed action involves
complete conformism and it is damaging to the principal. We say “argue” rather than “prove”
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because in this section we restric attention to pure-strategy equilibria (separating or pooling).
The rest of the paper will confirm the intuition obtained here.
Suppose that there exists a separating equilibrium in which, if y = 1 the agent chooses a = 1
and if y = 0 he chooses a = 0. We will show that with revealed action such an equilibrium cannot
exist. The principal’s belief π (a, x) in such a separating equilibrium is:
π (1, 1) = 23 , π (1, 0) =
1
2
π (0, 1) = 0 π (0, 0) = 12
The belief when a = 1 dominates the one when a = 0, in the sense that for any realization of x,
π (1, x) ≥ π (0, x). Then,
E (π (1, x) |y = 0) > E (π (0, x) |y = 0) ,
which means that the agent who observes y = 0 has a strict incentive to report a = 1. This
generates a contradiction.
A similar non-existence argument applies to the perverse separating equilibrium in which
a = |1− y|. The only possible equilibria are then pooling equilibria in which no information is
revealed (either the agent always plays a = 0 or he always plays a = 1). It is easy to check the
existence of such equilibria and that the principal is indiﬀerent among them (because x = 1 and
x = 0 are equiprobable).
Thus, with revealed action, the best equilibrium for the principal is one in which her expected
payoﬀ in the current period is 12 and her posterior is the same as her prior.
Instead, in the concealed action scenario there exists a separating equilibrium in which the
agent plays a = y . To see this, compute the agent posterior in such an equilibrium:
π˜ (1) =
1
2
¡
1 + 12
¢
3
4 +
1
2
=
3
5
π˜ (0) =
1
2
¡
0 + 12
¢
3
4 +
1
2
=
2
5
.
The agent maximizes his expected posterior by maximizing the expected value of u. As the signal
y is decision-relevant, this means that the optimal strategy is a = y.
In this separating equilibrium, the probability that the principal gets utility 1 in the first
period is
Pr (u = 1) =
1
4
1
2
+
1
4
1 +
1
4
1
2
+
1
4
1
2
=
5
8
.
Thus, with concealed action, the principal receives an expected payoﬀ of 58 in the first period and
she learns something about the agent type.
To sum up, by committing to keep the action concealed, the principal gets a double benefit.
On the discipline side, she increases her expected payoﬀ in the current period because the agent
follows his signal. On the sorting side, she improves the precision of her posterior on her agent
type. As her utility is convex in the posterior, this can only be beneficial.
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3.2 Concealed action
We now begin the analysis of the game introduced in Section 2. In this section we look at what
happens when the principal observes only the consequence u, which turns out to be the easier
part.
The principal’s posterior after observing the consequence is π (u) = Pr(θ = g|u). The agent
observes his signal y and maximizes Ex [π (u (a, x)) |y].
The main result is:
Proposition 3 With concealed action, there exists a separating equilibrium.
Proof. Consider a separating equilibrium in which a = y. The posterior is
π˜ (u = 1) =
γ (pq1g + (1− p) (1− q0g))
γ (pq1g + (1− p) (1− q0g)) + (1− γ) (pq1b + (1− p) (1− q0b))
;
π˜ (u = 0) =
γ ((1− p) (1− q1g) + pq0g)
γ ((1− p) (1− q1g) + pq0g) + (1− γ) ((1− p) (1− q1b) + pq0b)
.
From (1), we see that π˜ (u = 1) > γ > π˜ (u = 0). The agent chooses a to maximize Pr (u = 1|a, y).
Because of decision relevance (2), this is achieved by selecting a = y.
The analysis of the concealed action case is straightforward. There exists a separating equi-
librium in which the agent follows his signal and the principal puts a higher posterior on an agent
who obtains u = 1 than on one who fails. There may be other equilibria: uninformative, perverse
separating, semi-separating. But the separating equilibrium above is clearly the best from the
viewpoint of the principal.
3.3 Revealed action
We now consider the case in which the principal observes the action a as well, which turns out
to be the harder case because we need to deal with semi-separating equilibria.
We begin by excluding a certain class of mixed-strategy equilibria. There cannot exist an
informative equilibrium in which the agent plays a strictly mixed strategy both when y = 0 and
y = 1:
Proposition 4 There cannot exist an informative equilibrium in which α0 ∈ (0, 1) and α1 ∈
(0, 1).
Proof. Assume that there exists an equilibrium in which:
α0 ∈ (0, 1),α1 ∈ (0, 1),α0 6= α1,
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The agent must be indiﬀerent between the two actions for both realizations of y :
Pr (x = 0|y = 1) (π (0, 0)− π (1, 0)) = Pr (x = 1|y = 1) (π (1, 1)− π (0, 1)) , (5)
Pr (x = 0|y = 0) (π (0, 0)− π (1, 0)) = Pr (x = 1|y = 0) (π (1, 1)− π (0, 1)) . (6)
There are two cases:
(π (0, 0)− π (1, 0)) (π (1, 1)− π (0, 1)) ≤ 0 (7)
(π (0, 0)− π (1, 0)) (π (1, 1)− π (0, 1)) > 0 (8)
If (7) holds, note that in an informative equilibrium it cannot be that both π (0, 0) = π (1, 0) and
π (1, 1) = π (0, 1). But then we have a contradiction because the two sides of (5) have diﬀerent
signs.
If (8) holds, subtract (6) from (5)
(Pr (x = 0|y = 1)− Pr (x = 0|y = 0)) (π (0, 0)− π (1, 0)) (9)
= (Pr (x = 1|y = 1)− Pr (x = 1|y = 0)) (π (1, 1)− π (0, 1)) .
But by assumption (1) signals are informative on x:
Pr (x = 0|y = 1)− Pr (x = 0|y = 0) < 0;
Pr (x = 1|y = 1)− Pr (x = 1|y = 0) > 0.
Then, (8) creates a contradiction in (9).
This kind of result is common to many signalling games. If there existed an informative
equilibrium in which both α0 and α1 are interior, the agent would always be indiﬀerent between
playing 0 or 1. But this can be true only if signals are uninformative, which contradicts our
assumptions on q, or if posteriors are flat, which cannot be true in an informative equilibrium.
We now provide another result on the characterization of the equilibrium set. If there exists
an informative equilibrium, then there must also exist a (non-perverse) separating equilibrium:11
Proposition 5 There exists an equilibrium in which α0 6= α1 if and only if there exists an
equilibrium in which α0 = 0 and α1 = 1.
Proof. We begin by expressing beliefs in terms of primitives and strategies. It is useful to
make the dependence on strategies explicit (we use Π rather than π):
Π (1, x,α0,α1) =
(α1qxg + α0 (1− qxg)) γ
(α1qxg + α0 (1− qxg)) γ + (α1qxb + α0 (1− qxb)) (1− γ)
; (10)
Π (0, x,α0,α1) =
((1− α1) qxg + (1− α0) (1− qxg)) γ
((1− α1) qxg + (1− α0) (1− qxg)) γ + ((1− α1) qxb + (1− α0) (1− qxb)) (1− γ)
.(11)
11A similar equilibrium characterization result is found in Ottaviani and Sorensen [24, Lemma 1]. Their setup
is a special case of the present one because the agent signal y is symmetric. Using our notation, this corresponds
to the restriction q1θ = 1− q0θ for θ ∈ {b, g}.
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To simplify notation in the proof, we use the following (slightly abusive) notation for special
cases of Π (a, x,α0,α1):
Π (a, x) ≡ Π (a, x,α0 = 0,α1 = 1)
Π (a, x,α1) ≡ Π (a, x,α0 = 0,α1)
Π (a, x,α0) ≡ Π (a, x,α0,α1 = 1)
Throughout the proof, assume without loss of generality that y = 1 is the smart realization.
If y = 0 is the smart realization, just switch 0 and 1 for a, x, and y. Let us start by focusing on
informative equilibria in which α0 < α1 (non-perverse equilibria).
We begin with a result on separating equilibria. The necessary and suﬃcient conditions for
the existence of a non-perverse separating equilibrium are:
Pr (x = 1|y = 0) (Π (1, 1)−Π (0, 1)) ≤ Pr (x = 0|y = 0) (Π (0, 0)−Π (1, 0)) (12)
Pr (x = 1|y = 1) (Π (1, 1)−Π (0, 1)) ≥ Pr (x = 0|y = 1) (Π (0, 0)−Π (1, 0)) (13)
Claim 1: The inequality (13) is always satisfied. There exists a separating equilibrium if and
only if (12) holds.
Proof of Claim 1: (13) rewrites as:
Pr (x = 1, y = 1)
µ
Pr (g, y = 1, x = 1)
Pr (y = 1, x = 1)
− Pr (g, y = 0, x = 1)
Pr (y = 0, x = 1)
¶
≥ Pr (x = 0, y = 1)
µ
Pr (g, y = 0, x = 0)
Pr (y = 0, x = 0)
− Pr (g, y = 1, x = 0)
Pr (y = 1, x = 0)
¶
or
Pr (g, y = 1, x = 1) + Pr (g, y = 1, x = 0) = Pr (g, y = 1)
≥ Pr (y = 1, x = 1)
Pr (y = 0, x = 1)
Pr (g, y = 0, x = 1) +
Pr (y = 1, x = 0)
Pr (y = 0, x = 0)
Pr (g, y = 0, x = 0) .
But
Pr (y = 1, x = 1)
Pr (y = 0, x = 1)
Pr (g, y = 0, x = 1) +
Pr (y = 1, x = 0)
Pr (y = 0, x = 0)
Pr (g, y = 0, x = 0)
=
Pr (y = 1|x = 1)
Pr (y = 0|x = 1) Pr (g, y = 0, x = 1) +
Pr (y = 1|x = 0)
Pr (y = 0|x = 0) Pr (g, y = 0, x = 0)
≥ Pr (y = 1|x = 0)
Pr (y = 0|x = 0) (Pr (g, y = 0, x = 1) + Pr (g, y = 0, x = 0))
=
Pr (x = 0|y = 1)Pr (y = 1)
Pr (x = 0|y = 0)Pr (y = 0) (Pr (g, y = 0, x = 1) + Pr (g, y = 0, x = 0))
≥ Pr (y = 1)
Pr (y = 0)
Pr (g, y = 0) ,
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where the two inequalities are due to assumption (1). This shows that a suﬃcient condition for
(13) is
Pr (g, y = 1) ≥ Pr (y = 1)
Pr (y = 0)
Pr (g, y = 0)
But this corresponds to Pr (g|y = 1) ≥ Pr (g|y = 0), which is equivalent to the condition that
y = 1 is smart. The claim is proven.
From Proposition 4, there cannot exist an equilibrium in which 0 < α0 < α1 < 1. There
can be two cases: either α0 = 0 and α1 ∈ (0, 1] or α0 ∈ [0, 1) and α1 = 1. Claims 2 and 3 deal
with the two cases separately. Together, the claims prove that there exists an equilibrium with
α0 < α1 only if there exists an equilibrium with α0 = 0 and α1 = 1.
Claim 2: There cannot exist an equilibrium in which α0 = 0 and α1 ∈ (0, 1).
Proof of Claim 2: Suppose there exists an equilibrium in which α0 = 0 and α1 ∈ (0, 1]. It
must be that
Pr (x = 1|y = 1) (Π (1, 1,α1)−Π (0, 1,α1)) = Pr (x = 0|y = 1) (Π (0, 0,α1)−Π (1, 0,α1)) . (14)
Note that Π (0, x,α1) = Π (0, x) and
Π (0, x,α1)
=
(Pr(y = 0|g, x) + (1− α1) Pr(y = 1|g, x)) Pr(g)
Pr(y = 0|x) + (1− α1) Pr(y = 1|x)
=
Pr(y=0|g,x) Pr(g)
Pr(y=0|x) Pr(y = 0|x) + (1− α1) Pr(y=1|g,x)Pr(g)Pr(y=1|x) Pr(y = 1|x)
Pr(y = 0|x) + (1− α1) Pr(y = 1|x)
= A (x,α1)Π (0, x) + (1−A (x,α1))Π (1, x) ,
where
A (x,α1) ≡
Pr(y = 0|x)
Pr(y = 0|x) + (1− α1) Pr(y = 1|x) .
Condition (14) rewrites as
Pr (x = 1|y = 1)A (1,α1) (Π (1, 1)−Π (0, 1))
= Pr (x = 0|y = 1)A (0,α1) (Π (1, 0)−Π (0, 0)) ,
which in turn is expressed as
Pr (x = 1|y = 1) (Π (1, 1)−Π (0, 1)) = Pr (x = 0|y = 1) A (0,α1)
A (1,α1)
(Π (0, 0)−Π (1, 0)) .
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Note that
max
α1
A (0,α1)
A (1,α1)
= max
α1
Pr(y = 0|x = 0)
Pr(y = 0|x = 1)
Pr(y = 0|x = 1) + (1− α1) Pr(y = 1|x = 1)
Pr(y = 0|x = 0) + (1− α1) Pr(y = 1|x = 0)
=
Pr(y = 0|x = 0)
Pr(y = 0|x = 1)
Pr(y = 0|x = 1) + Pr(y = 1|x = 1)
Pr(y = 0|x = 0) + Pr(y = 1|x = 0)
=
Pr(y = 0|x = 0)
Pr(y = 0|x = 1) .
A necessary condition for (14) to hold is then
Pr (x = 1|y = 1) (Π (1, 1)−Π (0, 1)) ≤ Pr (x = 0|y = 1) Pr(y = 0|x = 0)
Pr(y = 0|x = 1) (Π (0, 0)−Π (1, 0)) .
This rewrites as
Pr (x = 1)Pr (y = 1|x = 1)Pr (y = 0|x = 1) (Π (1, 1)−Π (0, 1))
≤ Pr (x = 0)Pr (y = 1|x = 0)Pr(y = 0|x = 0) (Π (0, 0)−Π (1, 0)) ;
Pr (x = 1) (Pr(y = 0|x = 1)Pr(g, y = 1|x = 1)− Pr (y = 1|x = 1)Pr(g, y = 0|x = 1))
≤ Pr (x = 0) (Pr(y = 1|x = 0)Pr(g, y = 1|x = 0)− Pr (y = 0|x = 0)Pr(g, y = 0|x = 0)) ;
Because θ and x are independent,
Pr (x = 1) (Pr(y = 0|x = 1)Pr(y = 1|g, x = 1)− Pr (y = 1|x = 1)Pr(y = 0|g, x = 1))
≤ Pr (x = 0) (Pr(y = 1|x = 0)Pr(y = 0|g, x = 0)− Pr (y = 0|x = 0)Pr(y = 1|g, x = 0)) ;
By recalling that Pr(y|x) = γ Pr(y|g, x) + (1− γ) γ Pr(y|g, x), and with some simplification, we
get
Pr (x = 1) (Pr(y = 0|b, x = 1)Pr(y = 1|g, x = 1)− Pr (y = 1|b, x = 1)Pr(y = 0|g, x = 1))
≤ Pr (x = 0) (Pr(y = 1|b, x = 0)Pr(y = 0|g, x = 0)− Pr (y = 0|b, x = 0)Pr(y = 1|g, x = 0)) ;
p ((1− q1b) q1g − q1b (1− q1g))
≤ (1− p) (q0b (1− q0g)− (1− qb0) q0g) ;
p (q1g − q1b) ≤ (1− p) (q0b − q0g) ;
q0b − q0g
q1g − q1b
≤ p
1− p,
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which contradicts smartness.
Claim 3: If there exists an equilibrium in which α0 ∈ [0, 1) and α1 = 1, there exists an
equilibrium in which α0 = 0 and α1 = 1.
Proof of the claim: A necessary condition for the existence of an equilibrium in which α0 ∈
[0, 1) and α1 = 1, is that for some α0 ∈ [0, 1),
Pr (x = 1|y = 0) (Π (1, 1,α0)−Π (0, 1,α0)) ≤ Pr (x = 0|y = 0) (Π (0, 0,α0)−Π (1, 0,α0)) . (15)
We have Π (0, x,α0) = Π (0, x) and
Π (1, x,α0)
=
(Pr(y = 1|g, x) + α0 Pr(y = 0|g, x)) Pr(g)
(Pr(y = 1|x) + α0 Pr(y = 0|x))
=
Pr(y=1|g,x)Pr(g)
Pr(y=1|x) Pr(y = 1|x) + α0 Pr(y=0|g,x) Pr(g)Pr(y=0|x) Pr(y = 0|x)
(Pr(y = 1|x) + α0 Pr(y = 0|x))
= B (x,α0)Π (1, x) + (1−B (x,α0))Π (0, x) ,
where
B (x,α0) =
Pr(y = 1|x)
(Pr(y = 1|x) + α0 Pr(y = 0|x)) .
We can rewrite (15) as
Pr (x = 1|y = 0)B (1,α0) (Π (1, 1)−Π (0, 1)) ≤ Pr (x = 0|y = 0)B (0,α0) (Π (0, 0)−Π (1, 0)) ,
which in turn holds only if
Pr (x = 1|y = 0) (Π (1, 1)−Π (0, 1))min
α0
B (1,α0)
B (0,α0)
≤ Pr (x = 0|y = 0) (Π (0, 0)−Π (1, 0)) . (16)
But
min
α0
B (1,α0)
B (0,α0)
= min
α0
Pr(y = 1|x = 1)
Pr(y = 1|x = 0)
Pr(y = 1|x = 0) + α0 Pr(y = 0|x = 0)
Pr(y = 1|x = 1) + α0 Pr(y = 0|x = 1) = 1,
Then (16) rewrites as (12). If (15) holds, (12) holds, and by Claim 1 there exists a n equilibrium
in which α0 = 0 and α1 = 1.
We complete the proof by considering perverse informative equilibria. Suppose there exists
an equilibrium in which α0 > α1, with beliefs Π (a, x,α0,α1). For y ∈ {0, 1}, if a is played in
equilibrium it must be that:
a ∈ argmax
a˜
X
x∈{0,1}
Pr (x|y)Π (a˜, x,α0,α1)
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However, if such equilibrium exists, there also exist an equilibrium in which the agent plays
αˆ0 = α1 and αˆ1 = α0, and beliefs are
Πˆ (a, x, αˆ0, αˆ1) = Π (1− a, x,α0,α1)
The agent’s strategy is still a best response: if a is played in equilibrium
a ∈ argmax
a˜
X
x∈{0,1}
Pr (x|y) Πˆ (a˜, x,α0,α1)
Thus, if there exists a perverse informative equilibrium, there exists a non-perverse informative
equilibrium, and — as we see from Claims 2 and 3 — there exists a non-perverse separating
equilibrium.
Proposition 5 says that if the equilibrium set contains some kind of informative equilibrium
then it must also contain a non-perverse separating equilibrium. This is a useful characterization
because the existence conditions for semi-separating equilibria are hard to find, while the existence
conditions for separating equilibria are — as we shall see — straightforward.
The proposition is arrived at in two steps. First, we show that for every perverse informative
equilibrium (one in which the agent plays α0 > α1, ie knowingly chooses the wrong action), there
exists a specular non-perverse informative equilibrium. Second, if there exists a non-perverse
informative equilibrium, there must also exist a separating equilibrium.
The intuition for the second step has to do with the choice of the agent who observes the
non-smart realization (the “non-smart agent”). The incentive of the non-smart agent to follow
his own signal depends on the proportion of non-smart agents who follow their own signal. To
fix ideas, take y = 1 to be the smart action and suppose that α1 = 1. The question is how the
posterior depends on the proportion of non-smart agents who pretend to be smart: α0. Note that
α0 does not aﬀect the posteriors when a = 0 because only non-smart agents play a = 0. Instead,
the higher α0, the less information the principal can gather about the agent’s type when a = 1.
As α0 → 1, when a = 1 the state x provides no information about the agent’s type (because x
and θ are independent). In this case, a non-smart agent should certainly choose a = 1. This line
of reasoning holds for any α0: the higher α0, the stronger the incentive for a non-smart agent
to play a = 1. But then, if the agent is indiﬀerent between a = 0 and a = 1 for some α0, he
must strictly prefer a = 0 for α0 = 0: if there exists a semi-separating equilibrium, there exists
a separating equilibrium.
At an even more abstract level, the intuition is that a non-smart agent who chooses to imitate
a smart agent creates a positive externality for other conformist non-smart agents, who are now
better able to hide among smart agents without getting punished if they get the consequence
wrong. Then, a non-smart agent is most likely to want to follow his own signal when all other
non-smart agents are following their signals.
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The proposition does not imply that there do not exist semi-separating equilibria. It is
possible to find games in which there exist both a separating equilibrium and a semi-separating
equilibrium.
Now that we know that the condition for the existence of an informative equilibrium is the
same as the condition for the existence of a separating equilibrium, it is not hard to find such
condition.
Proposition 6 There exists an informative equilibrium if and only if
p
1− p
γq0g + (1− γ) q0b
γq1g + (1− γ) q1b
≤ q0b − q0g
q1g − q1b
≤ p
1− p
γ (1− q0g) + (1− γ) (1− q0b)
γ (1− q1g) + (1− γ) (1− q1b)
. (17)
Proof. The necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium in which
α0 = 0 and α1 = 1 are (12) and (13). We first show that (12) holds if and only if the first
inequality in (17) holds.
Note that
π (1, x)− π (0, x) =
µ
Pr(y = 1|g, x)
Pr(y = 1|x) −
Pr(y = 0|g, x)
Pr(y = 0|x)
¶
Pr(g)
=
Pr(y = 1|g, x) (1− Pr(y = 1|x))− (1− Pr(y = 1|g, x)) Pr(y = 1|x)
Pr(y = 1|x) Pr(y = 0|x) Pr(g)
=
Pr(y = 1|g, x)− Pr(y = 1|x)
Pr(y = 1|x) Pr(y = 0|x) Pr(g)
Then,
Pr (x|y = 0) (π (1, x)− π (0, x)) = Pr(y = 0|x) Pr(x)
Pr(y = 0)
Pr(y = 1|g, x)− Pr(y = 1|x)
Pr(y = 1|x) Pr(y = 0|x) Pr(g)
=
Pr(g)
Pr(y = 0)
Pr(x)
µ
Pr(y = 1|g, x)
Pr(y = 1|x) − 1
¶
Then, (12) holds if and only if
Pr(g)
Pr(y = 0)
µ
Pr(1)
Pr(y = 1|g, 1)
Pr(y = 1|1) + Pr(0)
Pr(y = 1|g, 0)
Pr(y = 1|0) − 1
¶
≤ 0
⇔
Pr(1)q1g (q0g Pr(g) + q0b Pr(b)) + Pr(0)q0g (q1g Pr(g) + q1b Pr(b))
− (q0g Pr(g) + q0b Pr(b)) (q1g Pr(g) + q1b Pr(b)) ≤ 0
⇔
Pr(1)q1g (q0g Pr(g) + q0b Pr(b)) + Pr(0)q0g (q1g Pr(g) + q1b Pr(b))
− (Pr(0) + Pr(1)) (q0g Pr(g) + q0b Pr(b)) (q1g Pr(g) + q1b Pr(b)) ≤ 0
⇔
Pr(1) (q1g − (q1g Pr(g) + q1b Pr(b))) (q0g Pr(g) + q0bPr(b))
+Pr(0) (q0g − (q0g Pr(g) + q0b Pr(b))) (q1g Pr(g) + q1b Pr(b)) ≤ 0
⇔ Pr(1) (q1g − q1b) Pr(b) (q0g Pr(g) + q0b Pr(b)) + Pr(0) (q0g − q0b) Pr(b) (q1g Pr(g) + q1b Pr(b)) ≤ 0
⇔ Pr(1) (q1g − q1b) (q0g Pr(g) + q0b Pr(b)) ≤ Pr(0) (q0b − q0g) (q1g Pr(g) + q1b Pr(b))
⇔ q0b − q0g
q1g − q1b
≥ p
1− p
Pr(b)q0b +Pr(g)q0g
Pr(g)q1g +Pr(b)q1b
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The proof that (13) is equivalent to the second inequality in the proposition is similar to the
argument above and it is omitted.
To understand Proposition 6, note that
p
1− p
γq0g + (1− γ) q0b
γq1g + (1− γ) q1b
< 1 and
γ (1− q0g) + (1− γ) (1− q0b)
γ (1− q1g) + (1− γ) (1− q1b)
> 1.
We can link condition (17) with the condition for the smart signal found in Proposition 2.
Both impose bounds on the term
q0b − q0g
q1g − q1b
,
which is the relative informativeness of the two y’s. The smartness condition establishes which
signal is more informative. The condition in Proposition 6 says whether one signal is much more
informative than the other.
If, for instance, y = 1 is the smart signal, then
q0b − q0g
q1g − q1b
<
p
1− p (18)
We can disregard the second inequality in Proposition 6 because it is implied by (18). Instead,
the inequality
q0b − q0g
q1g − q1b
≥ p
1− p
γq0g + (1− γ) q0b
γq1g + (1− γ) q1b
(19)
can hold or not. If it holds, there is no informative equilibrium because y = 1 is “too smart” to
allow for separation. If the equilibrium were informative, the agent who observes y = 0 would
always want to pretend he observed y = 1. If instead the inequality (19) does not hold, separation
is possible because the agent who observes y = 0 prefers to increase his likelihood to get u = 1
rather than pretend he has y = 1.
If we revisit the example presented earlier, we can now formally verify the result that there
is no informative equilibrium. Recall that in that example γ = 12 , p =
1
2 , q0b = q1b =
1
2 , q0g =
1
2 ,
and q1g = 1. The smartness condition (18) is
0
1
2
< 1.
The smart signal is y = 1. There exists an informative equilibrium if and only if (19) is satified.
That is,
0 ≥ 1
1
2
1
2 +
1
2
1
2
1
21 +
1
2
1
2
=
2
3
,
which shows that informative equilibria are impossible.
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If instead the smart signal had been less smart, an informative equilibrium would have been
possible. For instance, modify the example by assuming that if x = 0, the good type receives an
informative signal: q0g = 16 . The existence condition (19) becomes
1
2 −
1
6
1− 12
≥ 1
1
2
1
2 +
1
2
1
6
1
21 +
1
2
1
2
,
that is, 23 ≥
4
9 . Indeed, one can show that, holding the other parameters constant, there exists
an informative equilibrium if and only if q0g ≤ 14 .
3.4 When should the action be revealed?
We are now in a position to compare the expected payoﬀ of the principal in the best equilibrium
under concealed action with her expected payoﬀ in the best equilibrium with revealed action. As
we saw in Section 2, ex ante social welfare corresponds to the expected payoﬀ of the principal
because the expected payoﬀ of the agent is constant.
From Proposition 3, the best equilibrium with concealed action is a separating equilibrium
with a = y.
What happens with revealed action depends on condition (17). If the condition holds, there
exists a separating equilibrium with a = y. The agent behavior is thus the same as with concealed
action but the principal gets more information. The variance of the agent posterior increases and
the principal’s payoﬀ, which is convex in the posterior, goes up. Compared to concealed action,
the discipline eﬀect is the same but the sorting eﬀect improves. Thus, the principal is better
oﬀ.12
If instead condition (17) fails, there is no informative equilibrium and the best equilibrium is
one where the agent chooses the action that corresponds to the most likely state. The discipline
eﬀect worsens because the agent disregards useful information. sorting too is aﬀected negatively
because in an informative equilibrium the posterior is equal to the prior. Thus, the principal is
worse oﬀ. We summarize the argument as follows:
12Proof that screening is better when a is observed:X
x,y
Pr(x, y)v (π (y, x))
= Pr(y = x)
X
x
Pr(x)v (π (x, x)) + Pr(y 6= x)
X
x
Pr(x)v (π (1− x, x))
≥ Pr(y = x)
X
x
Pr(x)v (π˜ (1)) + Pr(y 6= x)
X
x
Pr(x)v (π˜ (0))
=
X
x,y
Pr(x, y)v (π (u (x, y)))
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Proposition 7 If (17) holds, revealing the agent’s action does not aﬀect discipline and improves
sorting. If (17) fails, revealing the agent’s action worsens both discipline and sorting. Hence, the
principal prefers to reveal the action if and only if (17) holds.
It may also be interesting to see if there is a tension between what is optimal ex ante and what
is optimal ex post. Suppose we are in a separating equilibrium. After the agent has chosen his
action, the principal always benefits from observing the action because she can use the additional
information for sorting purposes. However, before the agent has chosen his action, the principal
may want to commit not to observe the action ex post. In which way is the benefit of ex ante
concealment connected to the incentive for ex post observation?
Suppose that the smart signal is y = 1. As we saw above, a policy of concealment is optimal
if and only if (19) fails. The incentive to commit is simply represented by the variable c which
takes value 0 if (19) holds and 1 if it fails.
In a separating equilibrium, the benefit of observing a ex post is
r =
X
x,y
Pr(x, y)v (π (y, x))−
X
x,y
Pr(x, y)v (π˜ (u (y, x))) .
To make a simple comparative analysis exercise, we fix p and γ. We also hold constant the
following expressions: the probability that a good agent gets the signal right:
Pr (y = x|g) = pq1g + (1− p)(1− q0g) ≡ s;
and the probability of the signal given the state, non-conditional on the agent type,
Pr (y = 1|x) = qxgγ + qxb (1− γ) ≡ qx for x = 1, 2.
Note that this also implies that Pr(y = x) and Pr(y = x|b) are constant. This leaves one degree
of freedom on q, which can be represented without loss of generality with movements of the ratio
q0b−q0g
q1g−q1b . This degree of freedom corresponds to the relative informativeness of the two realizations
of y.
We show that there exists a tension between the ex ante incentive to commit not to observe
a and the ex post benefit of observation:
Proposition 8 The incentive to commit ex ante c and the benefit of observing the action ex post
r are both nondecreasing in q0b−q0gq1g−q1b .
Proof. c depends on whether (19) holds. As the right-hand side of (19) is constant, c is
nondecreasing in q0b−q0gq1g−q1b .
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Let us now consider r. As s is constant, an increase in q1g must be accompanied by an
increase in q0g. As qx is constant, an increase in qxg is associated to a decrease in qxb. Thus, a
decrease in q0b−q0gq1g−q1b corresponds to an increase in q1g and q0g and a decrease in q1b and q0b.
Given that a = y, the posteriors are
π (1, 0) =
q0gγ
q0gγ + q0b (1− γ)
;
π (0, 0) =
(1− q0g) γ
(1− q0g) γ + (1− q0) (1− γ)
;
π (1, 1) =
q1gγ
q1gγ + q1b (1− γ)
;
π (0, 1) =
(1− q1g) γ
(1− q1g) γ + (1− q1b) (1− γ)
.
A decrease in q0b−q0gq1g−q1b generates an increase in π (1, 1) and π (1, 0) and a decrease in π (0, 1) and
π (0, 0). The assumption that Pr(y = x|g) is constant means that π˜ (u) is constant as well.
The benefit of observing a when the agent plays a = y isX
x,y
Pr(x, y)v (π (y, x))−
X
x,y
Pr(x, y)v (π˜ (u (y, x))) .
Given that π˜ (u) is constant, we only consider the first part, which we rewrite as
V = Pr(y = x)
X
x˜
Pr(x˜)v (π (x˜, x˜)) + Pr(y 6= x)
X
x˜
Pr(x˜)v (π (1− x˜, x˜)) .
It is easy to check that π (1, 1) > π (0, 0) and π (1, 0) > π (0, 1). As v is convex, a decrease in
q0b−q0g
q1g−q1b increases both
P
x Pr(x)v (π (x, x)) and
P
x Pr(x)v (π (1− x, x)).
There is a tension between the ex ante benefit of concealed action and the ex post of revealed
action. If the agent plays according to his signal, the principal can infer whether the agent
received the smart signal or not. The more “smart” the smart signal is, the more useful the
information. In a highly asymmetric situation, ex post the principal stands to gain a lot from
knowing the agent’s action. But the agent realizes this and wants to hides the fact that he
receives the non-smart signal. This kills the separating equilibrium and damages the principal
in terms both of discipline and sorting. Thus, if the smart signal is “very smart”, the principal
is better oﬀ if she can commit to concealed action.
4 Complementarity between Observing Action and Consequence
We have so far asked whether revealing the agent’s action is a good idea, but we have maintained
the assumption that consequences are always observed. In some cases, especially in the political
arena, the principal may not be able to fully evaluate the consequences of the agent’s behavior
27
or may be able to do it with such a time lag that the information is of limited use for sorting
purposes. Take for instance a large-scale public project, such as a reform of the health system.
Its main provisions are observable right away, but it takes years for its eﬀects to develop. In the
medium term, the public knows the characteristics of the project that has been undertaken (the
action) but cannot yet judge its success (the consequence).
This section looks at what happens when consequences are not necessarily observed. The
focus will be mostly on the complementarity between transparency on action and transparency
on consequence. However, first, we examine the simple case in which the consequence goes totally
unobserved.
The game is as in the reduced form except that the principal observes either only a or nothing
at all. If the action is observed, it is easy to see that in equilibrium the choice of action must be
uncorrelated with the agent’s signal (otherwise one action would have a higher posterior and all
agents would choose it — contradiction). The best equilibrium for the principal is an uninformative
equilibrium in which the agent chooses the most likely action. No sorting occurs. If instead the
action is not observed, the best equilibrium is one in which the agent chooses a = y. No sorting
occurs but the first-period decision is better. Therefore, when u is not observed, the principal’s
expected payoﬀ is certainly higher when a is concealed.
This observation contrasts with the result obtained in the previous section that, when the
consequence is observed, revealing the action may a good idea, which seems to point to a com-
plementarity between observing consequences and revealing actions. As we shall now see, this
complementarity is indeed present in a general way.
Let ρu ∈ [0, 1] be the probability that u is observed and ρa ∈ [0, 1] be the probability
that a is observed. At stage 2 there are thus four possible information scenarios according to
whether the consequence and/or the action is observed. The previous section considered the
cases (ρu = 1, ρa = 1) and (ρu = 1, ρa = 0).
To simplify matters, we restrict attention to pooling and separating equilibria. We assume
that y = 1 is the smart signal and we look at the separating equilibrium in which a = y and
the pooling equilibrium in which the agent plays the most likely action. The pooling equilibrium
always exists. For every pair (ρu, ρa), we ask whether the separating equilibrium exists.
13
Proposition 9 For every ρu there exists ρ∗a (ρu) ∈ (0, 1] such that the game has a separating
equilibrium if and only if ρa ≤ ρ∗a. The threshold ρ∗a is nondecreasing in ρu.
Proof. Suppose that the agent chooses a = y. Let π(a, x), π (u(a, x)), π(a), and γ be the
13 It is not clear whether the analogue of Proposition 4 can be proven for this more complex case. Although
examples have not been found, one cannot exclude that there exists a semi-separating equilibrium when a separating
equilibrium does not exist.
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posterior evaluated by the principal in the four possible information scenarios. Note that because
we hold fixed the agent equilibrium strategy (a = y), these posteriors do not depend on (ρu, ρa)
but only on the information scenario that is realized. Given a and y, the expected posterior for
the agent is
E (π|a, y) = ρuρaEx(π(a, x)|y) + ρu (1− ρa)Ex(π(u(a, x)|y) + (1− ρu) ρaπ(a) + (1− ρu) (1− ρa) γ.
Note that the last two addends do not depend on x, and therefore on y. A necessary and suﬃcient
condition for the existence of a separating equilibrium is E (π|0, 0) ≥ E (π|1, 0), which rewrites
as:
(1− ρa) ρu (Ex(π(u(0, x)|y = 0)−Ex(π(u(1, x)|y = 0))
≥ ρa (ρu (Ex(π(1, x)|y = 0)−Ex(π(0, x)|y = 0)) + (1− ρu) (π(a = 1)− π(a = 0)))
or
(1− ρa) ρu∆1 ≥ ρa (ρu∆2 + (1− ρu)∆3) . (20)
Note that ∆1, ∆2, and ∆3 do not depend on (ρu, ρa). It is easy to see that ∆1 > 0 and that
∆3 > 0. By (1), we see that
Ex(π(1, x)|y = 0)−Ex(π(0, x)|y = 0)
< EyEx(π(1, x)|y)−EyEx(π(0, x)|y) < Ex(π(1, x)|y = 1)−Ex(π(0, x)|y = 1).
As EyEx(π(a, x)|y) = π(a), we have that ∆3 > ∆2. We rewrite (20) as
1− ρa
ρa
≥ ρu∆2 + (1− ρu)∆3
ρu∆1
.
On the right-hand side, the numerator is decreasing in ρu and the denominator is increasing.
The left-hand side is decreasing in ρa.
Proposition 9 has two parts. First, given a probability that the consequence is observed,
ρu, there exists a threshold ρ
∗
a (ρu) such that there exists a separating equilibrium if and only if
the probability of observing the action is below the threshold. For any level of transparency on
consequences, ρu, there exists a threshold ρ
∗
a (ρu) such that there exists a separating equilibrium
if and only if the level of transparency on action is within the threshold. Second, the threshold
is nondecreasing in ρu. More transparency on consequence allows for more transparency on
action without creating incentives for conformism. This is because conformism is deterred by the
threat of failure. The agent may impress the principal when he chooses the action associated to
the smart signal, but he is going to be punished if the action does not match the state of the
world. The risk of punishment is directly proportional to the probability that the consequence
is observed.
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5 When the Agent Knows His Own Type
So far we have assumed that the agent does not know his own type. In this section we remove
this restriction and see what happens (in one example) when the agent has some self-knowledge.
The agent receives a signal about his own type, which may be more or less informative. The
two extreme cases are when the agent knows his type perfectly and when he has no information
about it.
The objective of this section is to probe the robustness of the results obtained with no self-
knowledge. As we shall see, self-knowledge may reduce the incentive to behave in a conformist
way. Two points will be made. First, if the agent is perfectly informed about his own type, then
we show that there is an informative equilibrium. The good agent follows his signal while the
bad agent still behaves in a conformist manner. This is because an agent who knows that he has
a more precise signal has more of an incentive make decisions according to it. This result may
lead one to suspect that conformism is a non-robust feature of the case in which the agent has
no self-knowledge at all. However, the second point of this section is that if the signal the agent
receives about his own type is informative but weak, there still exists no informative equilibrium.
Thus the results appear to be robust to some self-knowledge but not to a lot of it.14
We modify the baseline model as follows. Before observing the signal y about the state x,
the agent receives a signal z ∈ {0, 1} about his own type θ. The signal z has distribution
Pr(z|θ) =
(
k if z = θ
1− k if z 6= θ
with k ∈
£
1
2 , 1
¤
. If k = 12 , the signal is uninformative and we return to the baseline model. If
k = 1, the agent knows his own type. Also, z and x are mutually independent, and z and y are
mutually independent conditional on x and θ. The rest of the game is as in the baseline model.
A strategy profile is then (αyz)y∈{0,1},z∈{b,g}, where αyz is the probability that an agent with
signal y and self-knowledge z plays a = 1.15
14The question of how well individuals assess their own skills is mostly open. The available evidence suggests
that people display some self-knowledge, but also that they overestimate their own ability (see Malmendier and
Tate [20] for a study on CEO overconfidence). It would be interesting — but outside the scope of the present work
— to allow for systematic deviations between the agent’s and the principal’s priors on the agent’s type.
15The type of the agent can now take four possible values while the message space, which still corresponds to
the action space, is binary. One may argue that this is an unnatural restriction and that the message space should
be enriched to have the same dimension as the action space. However, trading oﬀ generality for comparability and
simplicity, we choose to keep the set-up used in the rest of the paper.
Also, if the agent is allowed to send another binary cheap talk signal, it is easy to see that there cannot exist a
separating equilibrium in which a reveals y and the additional cheap talk signal reveals z, because the agent would
always prefer to state z = 1 rather than z = 0 (π (a, x, z = 1) > π (a, x, z = 0) for any a and x, because everything
else equal a higher z is good news about θ).
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In order to make the two main points of this section, it is suﬃcient to restrict attention to
the example discussed in Section 3.1. Thus: γ = 12 , p =
1
2 , q0b = q1b =
1
2 , q0g =
1
2 , and q1g = 1.
We show that if the agent knows his own type (k = 1) there is a new type of equilibrium in
which an agent with self-knowledge z = g plays in the eﬃcient way (a = y), while an agent with
z = b randomizes between the two actions:
Proposition 10 If k = 1, there exists an informative equilibrium in which an agent with z = 1
plays a = y and an agent with z = 0 plays according to α0 = α1 = 18
¡
1 +
√
41
¢ ' 0.92.
Proof. Given k = 1, consider strategy 0 = α0g ≤ α0b = α = α1b ≤ α1g = 1. The posteriors
are:
π (1, 1) =
1
1 + α
;
π (0, 1) = 0;
π (1, 0) =
1
1 + 2α
;
π (0, 0) =
1
3− 2α .
If the agent knows his type, the conditional probability of x given y is
Pr (x = 1|y = 1, z = g) = 2
3
;
Pr (x = 1|y = 0, z = g) = 0;
Pr (x = 1|y = 1, z = b) = Pr (x = 1|y = 0, b) = Pr (x = 1|b) = 1
2
.
In order for α ∈ (0, 1), the bad agent must be indiﬀerent between a = 0 and a = 1:
Pr (x = 1|z = b)π (1, 1) + Pr (x = 0|z = b)π (1, 0)
= Pr (x = 1|z = b)π (0, 1) + Pr (x = 0|z = b)π (0, 0) ,
yielding
1
1 + α
+
1
1 + 2α
= 0 +
1
3− 2α ,
with solution α = 18 +
1
8
√
41.
It is easy to verify that for an agent with g it is a best response to play a = y.
An agent who knows he is bad also knows that his signal y provides no information about
the state x. He evaluates Pr(x) according to the prior and he chooses the action according to
whether Ex (π (a, x)) is higher for a = 0 or a = 1. Instead, an agent who knows he is good
receives an informative signal about x and he uses Pr (x|y). That is why a bad agent randomizes
while a good agent follows his own signal. An increase in the probability that a bad agent chooses
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a = 1 worsens the posteriors π (1, x) and improves the posteriors π (0, x). Thus, there exists a
probability such that the bad agent is indiﬀerent between the two actions. However, at the same
point the good agent strictly prefers to follow his own signal. This determines an informative
equilibrium in which the good agent follows his own signal.
In Section 3 we saw that, when the agent does not observe his type, this example has no
informative equilibrium. We now show that this is still true when the agent has limited self-
knowledge.
Proposition 11 If k <
√
7− 2 ' 0.64, there exists no informative equilibrium.
Proof. Assume that k ∈ (0, 1). For future reference, the posteriors for a generic strategy
profile are:
π (1, 1) =
2kα1g + 2 (1− k)α1b
(1 + k)α1g + (1 + k)α1b + (1− k)α0g + kα0b
;
π (0, 1) =
2− (2kα1g + 2 (1− k)α1b)
4− ((1 + k)α1g + (1 + k)α1b + (1− k)α0g + kα0b)
;
π (1, 0) =
kα1g + (1− k)α1b + kα0g + (1− k)α0b
α1g + α1b + α0g + α0b
;
π (0, 0) =
2− (kα1g + (1− k)α1b + kα0g + (1− k)α0b)
4− (α1g + α1b + α0g + α0b)
.
One of the following must hold: α1b > α0b, α1b = α0b, or α1b < α0b. For every equilibrium
in which α1b < α0b there exists a specular equilibrium in which α1b > α0b. Thus we restrict
attention to the first two cases. The proof proceeds by showing that in each of the two cases
there exists no informative equilibrium if k is below a certain threshold.
Suppose that there exists an equilibrium in which α1b > α0b. It must be that
Pr (x = 1|y = 0, z = b) (π (1, 1)− π (0, 1)) ≤ Pr (x = 0|y = 0, z = b) (π (0, 0)− π (1, 0))(21)
Pr (x = 1|y = 1, z = b) (π (1, 1)− π (0, 1)) ≥ Pr (x = 0|y = 1, z = b) (π (0, 0)− π (1, 0))(22)
This implies that:
π (1, 1) ≥ π (0, 1) (23)
π (0, 0) ≥ π (1, 0) (24)
To see this: if (23) holds but (24) does not, (21) must be false; if (24) holds but (23) does not,
(22) must be false; and if neither (23) nor (24) hold, the fact that (21) holds implies that (22)
must be false. Given (21) and (22),
Pr (x = 1|y = 0, z = g) (π (1, 1)− π (0, 1)) < Pr (x = 0|y = 0, z = g) (π (0, 0)− π (1, 0))(25)
Pr (x = 1|y = 1, z = g) (π (1, 1)− π (0, 1)) > Pr (x = 0|y = 1, z = g) (π (0, 0)− π (1, 0))(26)
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Thus 0 = α0g ≤ α0b < α1b ≤ α1g = 1. For (25) to hold, it must be π (1, 0) < π (0, 0), implying
2kα1g + 2 (1− k)α1b + 2kα0g + 2 (1− k)α0b < α1g + α1b + α0g + α0b;
(2k − 1)α1g + (2k − 1)α0g < (2k − 1)α1b + (2k − 1)α0b;
α1g + α0g < α1b + α0b.
This means that α1b + α0b > 1. By an argument similar to Proposition 4, it cannot be that
0 < α0b < α1b < 1. Hence, α1b = 1. We then know that 0 = α0g ≤ α0b < α1b = α1g = 1, and the
posteriors are
π (1, 1) =
2k + 2 (1− k)
2k + 2 (1− k) + 1 + kα0b
;
π (0, 1) = 0;
π (1, 0) =
k + (1− k) (1 + α0b)
k + (1− k) (1 + α0b) + (1− k) + k (1 + α0b)
;
π (0, 0) =
2− (k + (1− k) (1 + α0b))
4− (k + (1− k) (1 + α0b) + (1− k) + k (1 + α0b))
.
We see that
Pr (x = 1|y = 0, z = b) = Pr (x = 1, y = 0, z = b|θ = g) + Pr (x = 1, y = 0, z = b|θ = b)
Pr (y = 0, z = b|θ = g) + Pr (y = 0, z = b|θ = b)
=
1
2k
1
2k +
1
2
=
k
1 + k
Then a necessary condition for α0b < 1 is
k (π (1, 1)− π (0, 1)) + (π (1, 1)− π (0, 1)) ≤ 0,
which rewrites as
−4k + (6k − 3)α0 + 2k2α20 ≥ 0,
which, given that k ≥ 12 , cannot hold if
−3 + 6k + 2k2 − 4k < 0,
with solution
k <
1
2
³√
7− 1
´
∼= 0.82.
Thus, if k < 12
¡√
7− 1
¢
, there is no equilibrium in which α1b > α0b.
Next consider an equilibrium in which α1b = α0b. By an argument similar to the one use
above, it is easy to see that 0 ≤ α0g ≤ α0b = α1b ≤ α1g ≤ 1. It cannot be that 0 < α0b = α1b < 1.
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Either 0 = α0g = α0b = α1b ≤ α1g = 1 or 0 ≤ α0g = α0b = α1b = α1g = 1. It is easy to exclude
the first case (because a = 1, which is smart and optimal, is too appealing to an agent with y = 1
and z = b).
We are then left with the possibility that 0 ≤ α0g ≤ α0b = α1b = α1g = 1. The posteriors are:
π (1, 1) =
2k + 2 (1− k)
2k + 2 (1− k) + k + (1− k) + (1− k)α0g + k
;
π (0, 1) = 0;
π (1, 0) =
k + (1− k) + kα0g + (1− k)
3 + α0g
;
π (0, 0) = k.
Note that
Pr (x = 1|y = 0, z = g) = Pr (x = 1, y = 0, z = g|θ = g) + Pr (x = 1, y = 0, z = g|θ = b)
Pr (y = 0, z = g|θ = g) + Pr (y = 0, z = g|θ = b)
=
1
2 (1− k)
1
2 (1− k) +
1
2
=
1− k
2− k .
A necessary condition for α0g < 1 is
(1− k) (π (1, 1)− π (0, 1)) + (π (1, 0)− π (0, 0)) ≥ 0,
which rewrites as
3− 4k − k2 +
¡
1− 2k + k2
¢
α0 ≤ 0,
which cannot hold if
3− 4k − k2 > 0,
with solution k <
√
7− 2 ' 0.64..
As 12
¡√
7− 1
¢
>
√
7− 2, the proof is complete.
If the agent has self-knowledge, we know that an agent who thinks he is above average has
a stronger incentive to follow his signal. Still, if self-knowledge is weak, this is not enough to
overcome the agent’s desire to make the principal believe that he received the smart signal. The
proof of this fact — even just for the example — is quite convoluted because it involves excluding
all the possible cases of informative equilibria.
6 General Case
The baseline model had strong restrictions on the action space, signal space, consequence space,
and state space, which were all assumed to be binary. This section considers a general setup. We
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shall see that some of the results proven earlier can still be proven in this more general version. In
particular, we can still say a lot about the existence or non-existence of separating equilibria (what
we cannot study, because of sheer complexity, is the existence of other informative equilibria).
In particular we are able to give support to the two main messages of this paper. First, if one
of the possible realizations of the agent signal is “too smart”, then there exists no separating
equilibrium. Second, transparency on action generates conformism, and it does especially if there
is little transparency on consequence. In other words, we prove results that correspond, at least
partially, to Propositions 6 and 9.
Let u ∈ U , a ∈ A, x ∈ X, y ∈ Y where U , A, X, and Y are finite sets. Additionally,
U is real-valued. For analytical tractability, we still assume that θ ∈ {b, g}. For every x, let
p (x) = Pr(x). For every x, y, and θ, let qθ (y|x) = Pr (y|x, θ). The distributions p and q are
assumed to have full support. The consequence is given by u = ω (a, x). Also define
q (y|x) = qg (y|x) γ + qb (y|x) (1− γ) .
We make two additional assumptions
A1 (Decision Value of Signal) There exists a∗ : Y → A such that, for all a, y, u,X
x:ω(a∗(y),x)≥u
q (y|x) p (x) ≥
X
x:ω(a,x)≥u
q (y|x) p (x)
Assumption A1 says that there exists a decision function a∗ which is optimal in a strong
sense: for every u, the probability of obtaining at least u is higher if the agent use a∗ than if he
uses any other decision function. The assumption implies that a∗ is optimal in the usual sense:
for every y,
a∗(y) ∈ argmax
a
X
x
ω (a, x) Pr (x|y) .
A2 (Sorting Value of Signal) The decision function a∗ also satisfies, for every u0 ≥ u and y,P
x:ω(a∗(y),x)=u0 qg (y|x) p (x)P
x:ω(a∗(y),x)=u0 qb (y|x) p (x)
≥
P
x:ω(a∗(y),x)=u qg (y|x) p (x)P
x:ω(a∗(y),x)=u qb (y|x) p (x)
This second assumption says that, in an equilibrium in which the agent uses a∗, the ratio be-
tween the probability that a good agent plays a certain a and obtains a certain u and a bad agent
plays the same a and obtains the same u is increasing in u. It is akin to the monotone likelihood
ratio condition in moral hazard. It guarantees that a higher type of agent who implements the
optimal decision rule a∗ is more likely to produce a good consequence.
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We now come to what the principal observes. Let ρu ∈ [0, 1] be the probability that u is
observed and ρa ∈ [0, 1] be the probability that a is observed. The two events are independent
(so, for instance, the probability that the principal sees a but not u is (1− ρu) ρa).
The following result parallels Proposition 9. A separating equilibrium is more likely to exist
when there is more transparency on consequence and less transparency on action:
Proposition 12 Take ρ0u ≤ ρu and ρ0a ≥ ρa. Under A1 and A2, there exists an equilibrium in
which the agent uses a∗ under (ρ0u, ρ0a) only if there exists an equilibrium in which the agent uses
a∗ under (ρu, ρa).
16
Proof. For future reference, note that
Pr (u|a, y) =
P
x:ω(a,x)=u q(y|x)p(x)P
x q(y|x)p(x)
.
Suppose the agent uses a∗. The posteriors in the four possible information scenarios are:
π (a, u) =



P
y:a∗(y)=a
P
x:ω(a∗(y),x)=u qg(y|x)p(x)γP
y:a∗(y)=a
P
x:ω(a∗(y),x)=u q(y|x)p(x) if a is played in equilibrium
unrestricted otherwise
π (u) =
P
y
P
x:ω(a∗(y),x)=u qg (y|x) p (x) γP
y
P
x:ω(a∗(y),x)=u q (y|x) p (x)
π (a) =



P
y:a∗(y)=a
P
x qg(y|x)p(x)γP
y:a∗(y)=a
P
x q(y|x)p(x) if a is played in equilibrium
unrestricted otherwise
π (∅) = γ
Given (ρu, ρa), there exists an equilibrium in which the agent uses a
∗ if and only if, for every
y,
a∗ (y) ∈ argmax
a
X
u
Pr (u|a, y) (ρuρaπ (a, u) + ρu (1− ρa)π (u)) + (1− ρu) ρaπ (a) + (1− ρu) (1− ρa)π (∅) ,
Claim 1: For every a and y,X
u
(Pr (u|a∗ (y) , y)− Pr (u|a, y))π (u) ≥ 0.
16Given that this section is about generality, one may ask how much Proposition 12 depends on the assumption
that the agent’s utility is linear in the posterior. Suppose instead that the agent’s payoﬀ is given by some nonde-
creasing function of the posterior: w (π). It turns out that the part of the proposition about action revelation is
still true. One can prove (an appendix is available from the author) that, for any ρu and for any ρ
0
a > ρa, there
exists an equilibrium in which the agent uses a∗ under (ρu, ρ
0
a) only if there exists an equilibrium in which the
agent uses a∗ under (ρu, ρa). Instead the strategy used to prove the other part of the proposition — the one about
consequence revelation — does not extend beyond a linear w. It is not clear whether this failure can be fixed by
using another line of proof or it is actually due to a failure of this second part for nonlinear utility functions.
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Proof of Claim 1: Note that
Pr (U ≥ u|a, y) =
P
x:ω(a,x)≥u q(y|x)p(x)P
x q(y|x)p(x)
By A1,
Pr (U ≥ u|a∗ (y) , y)
Pr (U ≥ u|a, y) =
P
x:ω(a∗(y),x)≥u q(y|x)p(x)P
x:ω(a,x)≥u q(y|x)p(x)
≥ 1.
Thus, Pr (·|a∗ (y) , y) first—order stochastically dominates Pr (·|a, y).
By A2, for every y, P
x:ω(a∗(y),x)=u qg (y|x) p (x)P
x:ω(a∗(y),x)=u qb (y|x) p (x)
is nondecreasing in u. Hence, it easy to see thatP
x:ω(a∗(y),x)=u qg (y|x) p (x)P
x:ω(a∗(y),x)=u q (y|x) p (x)
is also nondecreasing in u. This means that
π (u) =
P
y
P
x:ω(a∗(y),x)=u qg (y|x) p (x) γP
y
P
x:ω(a∗(y),x)=u q (y|x) p (x)
is also nondecreasing in u.
The proof of the claim is completed by a standard argument combining first—order stochastic
dominance and monotonicity.
Claim 2: Suppose ρ0a > ρa. There exists an equilibrium in which the agent uses a∗ under
(ρu, ρ
0
a) only if there exists an equilibrium in which the agent uses a
∗ under (ρu, ρa).
Proof of Claim 2: Suppose not. Then, there exists a y and an a /∈ a∗ (y) such thatX
u
Pr (u|a∗ (y) , y) (ρuρaπ (a∗ (y) , u) + ρu (1− ρa)π (u)) + (1− ρu) ρaπ (a∗ (y)) (27)
<
X
u
Pr (u|a, y) (ρuρaπ (a, u) + ρu (1− ρa)π (u)) + (1− ρu) ρaπ (a) ;
and X
u
Pr (u|a∗ (y) , y) ¡ρuρ0aπ (a∗ (y) , u) + ρu ¡1− ρ0a¢π (u)¢+ (1− ρu) ρ0aπ (a∗ (y)) (28)
≥
X
u
Pr (u|a, y) ¡ρuρ0aπ (a, u) + ρu ¡1− ρ0a¢π (u)¢+ (1− ρu) ρ0aπ (a) .
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Subtracting (27) from (28),
ρu
X
u
(Pr (u|a∗ (y) , y)− Pr (u|a, y))π (u) (29)
−
Ã
ρu
ÃX
u
(Pr (u|a∗ (y) , y)π (a∗ (y) , u)− Pr (u|a, y)π (a, u))
!
+ (1− ρu) (π (a∗ (y))− π (a))
!
< 0
However, by Claim 1, in order for (27) to hold, it must be that
ρu
X
u
(Pr (u|a∗ (y) , y)π (a∗ (y) , u)− Pr (u|a, y)π (a, u)) + (1− ρu) (π (a∗ (y))− π (a)) < 0
But the right-hand side of (29) is positive — contradiction.
Claim 3: Suppose ρ0u < ρu. There exists an equilibrium in which the agent uses a∗ under
(ρ0u, ρa) only if there exists an equilibrium in which the agent uses a∗ under (ρu, ρa).
Proof of Claim 3: Suppose not. Then, there exists a y and an a /∈ a∗ (y) such that (27) holds
and X
u
Pr (u|a∗ (y) , y) ¡ρ0uρaπ (a∗ (y) , u) + ρ0u (1− ρa)π (u)¢+ ¡1− ρ0u¢ ρaπ (a∗ (y)) (30)
≥
X
u
Pr (u|a, y) ¡ρ0uρaπ (a, u) + ρ0u (1− ρa)π (u)¢+ ¡1− ρ0u¢ ρaπ (a) .
implyingX
u
Pr (u|a∗ (y) , y) (ρaπ (a∗ (y) , u) + (1− ρa)π (u))− Pr (u|a, y) (ρaπ (a, u) + (1− ρa)π (u))31)
< ρa (π (a
∗ (y))− π (a))
If π (a∗ (y)) ≥ π (a), (30) implies thatX
u
Pr (u|a∗ (y) , y) (ρaπ (a∗ (y) , u) + (1− ρa)π (u))− Pr (u|a, y) (ρaπ (a, u) + (1− ρa)π (u)) > 0,
and there is a contradiction in (31) because the left-hand side is positive and the right-hand side
is negative.
If π (a∗ (y)) < π (a), we find a contradiction as follows. Note that
X
u
Pr (u|a, y)π (a, u) =
(
π (a) if a is played in equilibrium (ie ∃y, a ∈ a∗ (y) )
unrestricted otherwise
Hence, if a is played in equilibrium,X
u
(Pr (u|a∗ (y) , y)π (a∗ (y) , u)− Pr (u|a, y)π (a, u)) = π (a∗ (y))− π (a) > 0,
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If a is played in equilibrium, then we can always set π (a, u) = 0 for all u’s andX
u
(Pr (u|a∗ (y) , y)π (a∗ (y) , u)− Pr (u|a, y)π (a, u)) ≥ π (a∗ (y))− π (a) > 0.
In both cases, the combination ofX
u
(Pr (u|a∗ (y) , y)π (a∗ (y) , u)− Pr (u|a, y)π (a, u)) > 0
and Claim 1 shows that the left-hand side of (27) is positive, which generates a contradiction.
Claims 2 and 3 together prove the proposition.
By Proposition 12, if there exists an equilibrium in which the agent uses the optimal decision
rule a∗ with given ρu and ρa, the same equilibrium exists also if we take a higher ρu and a lower
ρa.
The intuition behind the result is straightforward. Assumption A1 guarantees that the de-
cision rule a∗ is optimal. Assumption A2 implies that, if the agent plays a∗, a good agent is
more likely to get a high consequence than a bad agent. If only the consequence is observed (the
extreme case in which ρu = 1 and ρa = 0), the agent’s incentives are aligned with the principal’s
objective function. A better consequence is good news for the agent’s type. Observing the action
can only upset this incentive alignment. The contribution of the proposition lies in showing that
this comparative statics result also holds for any ρu and ρa are interior. An increase in ρu and a
decrease in ρa can only make the agent less willing to follow the optimal decision rule a
∗.
If we are willing to make a mild assumption on the optimal decision rule, we get a full
characterization of the existence region:
Corollary 13 Suppose that A1 and A2 hold and that, for some y0 and y00, a∗ (y0) 6= a∗ (y00).
Then, for every ρu there exists a ρ
∗
a (ρu) such that an equilibrium in which the agent uses a
∗
exists if and only if ρa ≤ ρ∗a (ρu). Moreover, ρ∗a (1) > 0, ρ∗a (0) = 0, and ρ∗a is nondecreasing in
ρu.
Proof. Given that for some y0 and y00, a∗ (y0) 6= a∗ (y00), there cannot exist an equilibrium in
which the agent plays a∗ when ρu = 0 and ρa > 0. However, there exists one when ρu = ρa = 0.
Thus, ρ∗a (0) = 0. When ρu = 1 and ρa = 0, it is easy to check that A1 and A2 imply existence.
Hence, ρ∗a (1) > 0. The rest of the corollary is immediate given Proposition 12.
There are two possible cases. First, for every ρu and ρa there exists an equilibrium in which
the agent plays a∗. Second, there are two regions: one containing (ρu = 1, ρu = 0) in which the
agent plays a∗, the other containing (ρu = 0, ρu = 1) in which there is no equilibrium in which
the agent plays a∗. The two regions are divided by ρ∗a (ρu) which is nondecreasing in ρu.
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Lastly, we look at smartness. The notion of smart realization becomes more complicated in
the general setup but it can still be applied. In the simpler model used in the rest of the paper,
we saw that if one realization of the agent signal y is exceedingly smart, in the sense that it is
a very good signal for the agent’s type, then there may not be a separating equilibrium because
an agent would laways pretend to have observed the smart realization. As we shall see, this line
of reasoning is still valid in the general case.
We keep A1 and A2, and, to simplify things, we assume that the optimal decision rule a∗ is
such that, for every y, a∗(y0) is a singleton and a∗(y0) 6= a∗(y00) whenever y0 6= y00.
Given y00, y0 ∈ Y , we say that realization y00 is uniformly more smart than realization y0 if,
for all x, x˜ ∈ X,
qg (y
00|x)
qb (y00|x) >
qg (y
0|x˜)
qb (y0|x˜) . (32)
Uniform smartness is a strong condition because it imposes an inequality on likelihood ratios
even when the likelihood ratios refer to diﬀerent states of the world. We can then show a partial
analogous to Proposition 6:
Proposition 14 Suppose ρa = ρu = 1. If there exists y00, y0 ∈ Y such that y00 is uniformly more
smart than y0, then there exists no equilibrium in which the agent plays a∗.
Proof. From the proof of Proposition 12, we have that
π (a∗(y), u) =
P
x:ω(a∗(y),x)=u qg (y|x) p (x) γP
x:ω(a∗(y),x)=u q (y|x) p (x)
If y00 is smart with respect to y0, the definition of smartness (32) implies that for any u, u˜ ∈ UP
x:ω(a∗(y00),x)=u qg (y
00|x) p (x)P
x:ω(a∗(y00),x)=u q (y
00|x) p (x) >
P
x:ω(a∗(y0),x)=u˜ qg (y
0|x) p (x)P
x:ω(a∗(y0),x)=u˜ q (y
0|x) p (x) .
Therefore, π (y00, u) > π (y0, u˜) for any u and u˜. But this, in turn, means thatX
u
Pr
¡
u|a∗ ¡y00¢ , y0¢π ¡a∗ ¡y00¢ , u¢ >X
u
Pr
¡
u|a∗ ¡y0¢ , y0¢π ¡a∗ ¡y0¢ , u¢ ,
which shows that there exists no equilibrium in which the agent plays a∗.
This result is easily understood. We are looking for an equilibrium in the revealed action
scenario in which the agent’s action fully reveals the agent’s signal. The principal knows the agent
signal y and the consequence u. But the uniform smartness condition implies that observing y00
and any u is better news about the agent type than observing y0 and any u˜. The agent then
prefers a∗ (y00) over a∗ (y0) no matter what distributions a∗ (y00) and a∗ (y0) induce over the the
consequence u.
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Proposition 14 diﬀers from Proposition 6, which was proven for the baseline model, in two
respects. First, in the baseline model we provided a condition for the existence of any informative
equilibrium, while here we can only say something about separating equilibria. This prevents
us from using Proposition 14 to draw welfare conclusions. Second, Proposition 6 provided a
necessary and suﬃcient condition, while uniform smartness is just a suﬃcient condition.
To elaborate on this point, we provide an example that shows that uniform smartness is not
too strong. There are games in which some realizations of the signal are uniformly more smart
than others. Suppose that X = A = Y = {1, 2, 3} and U = {0, 1}. Also, p(x) = 13 for all x and
γ = 12 . The signal distribution is
qb (y|x) x = 1 x = 2 x = 3
y = 1 .5 .5 .5
y = 2 .2 .2 .2
y = 3 .3 .3 .3
qg (y|x) x = 1 x = 2 x = 3
y = 1 .5 .0 .0
y = 2 .3 .8 .3
y = 3 .2 .2 .8
which gives likelihood ratios:
qg(y|x)
qb(y|x) x = 1 x = 2 x = 3
y = 1 1 0 0
y = 2 32 4
3
2
y = 3 23
2
3
8
3
Hence y = 2 is uniformly more smart than y = 1.
The consequence function is assumed to be:
ω (a, x) x = 1 x = 2 x = 3
a = 1 1 0 0
a = 2 0 1 0
a = 3 0 0 1
By combining qb (y|x) and qg (y|x), we get:
q (y|x) x = 1 x = 2 x = 3
y = 1 .50 .25 .25
y = 2 .25 .50 .25
y = 3 .25 .25 .50
By combining q (y|x) and ω (a, x), the optimal decision function is
a∗(y) =



1 if y = 1
2 if y = 2
3 if y = 3
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Given a∗, one can easily check that A1 and A2 are satisfied.
If the agent plays according to a∗, the posteriors are
π (a, u) u = 0 u = 1
a = 1 0 12
a = 2 35
4
5
a = 3 25
8
11
For every u and u˜, π (2, u) dominates π (1, u˜). The agent prefers to play y = 2 rather than y = 1.
Note that y = 2 is not uniformly more smart than y = 3. Still, E (π (2, u) |y = 3) >
E (π (2, u) |y = 2).
7 Conclusion
This paper has identified a set of circumstances under which committing to concealing a certain
kind of information can make the principal better oﬀ. First, the principal and the agent must be
unable to sign performance-related contracts. Second, the agent should be an expert, in the sense
that his career depends on how able he is perceived to understand the state of the world. Third,
the information about the agent’s behavior should be separable into a part that is directly utility-
relevant for the principal and a part that is not. If these conditions are met, then revealing the
non-directly utility-relevant signal may make the agent behave in a more conformist way, which
worsens both discipline and sorting.
Are the theoretical results obtained in this paper useful for understanding existing institu-
tional arrangements? The idea that more information about non-directly utility-relevant infor-
mation may induce the agent to behave in a suboptimal way because of career concerns is clearly
present in political writings. In its famous 1974 ruling related to the Watergate case (US vs.
Nixon), the US Supreme Court uses the following argument to defend the principle behind ex-
ecutive privilege: “Human experience teaches us that those who expect public dissemination of
their remarks may well temper candor with a concern for appearances and for their own interest
to the detriment of the decision-making process.” Britain’s Open Government code of practice
uses a similar rationale when it provides that “internal discussion and advice can only be withheld
where disclosure of the information in question would be harmful to the frankness and candour
of future discussions.” (Campaign for Freedom Information [5, p. 3]).
More precise implications can be extracted from Proposition 9. The optimal degree of action
revelation is increasing in the degree of consequence revelation. We should expect transparency
on decisions to go hand in hand with transparency on consequences. In particular, an action,
or the intention to take an action, should not be revealed before the consequences of the action
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are observed. Indeed, Frankel [14] reports that all the 30-plus countries that have adopted an
open government code allow for some form of short-term secrecy while the decision process is
still ongoing. For instance, Sweden, the country with the oldest and, perhaps the most forceful,
freedom of information act, does not recognize the right for citizens to obtain information about a
public decision until that decision is implemented. Working papers and internal recommendations
that lead to a decision are released only when voters begin to have a chance to form an opinion
on the consequence of the decision in question.17
The result on complementarity has also another implication. If, for exogenous reasons, citizens
are less likely to observe the consequence, optimal institutional design dictates less transparency
with regards to action. This may help explain why EU-level bodies are less transparent than the
corresponding institututions at the national level. The meetings of the highest legislative body
of each EU country are usually public, while, as we saw earlier, the Council of the European
Union meets behind closed doors. There is no doubt that Europeans find it easier to evaluate
the consequences of policy in areas that are typically under national jurisdiction (health, pen-
sions, education, transports, etc...) rather than areas mainly under EU control (harmonization
policy, competition policy, agricoltural subsidies, etc...). According to our results, the exogenous
diﬀerential of information on payoﬀ-relevant observables (laws) is optimally associated to a diﬀer-
ential of information on non-payoﬀ-relevant observables (positions during meetings). A Council
in which debates were public would risk to give its members so strong an incentive to conform
to citizens’ expectations that its meetings would lose their information aggregating function.18
Lastly, we briefly relate our theory to transparency in corporate governance and delegated
portfolio management. Regarding the former, shareholders receive information about the man-
agement of their firm from the accounting reports that the firm makes. Clearly, accounting
involves a great deal of aggregation both across time and across areas. Accounting research has
been active on the issue of the optimal degree of disaggregation. One point that is particularly de-
bated, both among researchers and policy-makers, is whether a firm should provide disaggregated
data about its productive segments (segment disclosure) on a quarterly basis or just on a yearly
basis (Leuz and Verrecchia [18]). Currently, in the US there is no legal requirement for quarterly
segment disclosure: some firms follow a disclosure policy and others do not. Evidence on whether
17A historical example of this transparency policy is the US Constitutional Convention. George Mason refers to
the secrecy of the Convention meetings as “a proper precaution” because it averted “mistakes and misrepresenta-
tions until the business shall have been completed, when the whole may have a very diﬀerent complexion from that
in which the several parts might in their first shape appear if submitted to the public eye” (Farrand [12, 3:28,32])
18The view that keeping Council meetings secret is desirable is often found in the writings of scholars of European
politics. For instance, Calleo [4, p. 270-271] states that “Whether making Council debates more open is, of course,
debatable. Discrete decision making, dominated by expert advisers, has its advantages, especially in periods of
prolonged economic diﬃculty.”
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segment disclosure improves firm performance is inconclusive (Botosan and Harris [3]). Without
quarterly segment disclosure, shareholders still have information about short term consequences
(from quarterly aggregated reports). What they have diﬃculty with is inferring the strategy
that the firm is following, especially with regard to resource allocation across productive areas.
Segment disclosure can then be seen as an improvement in transparency over action. Thus, the
present theory provides an additional angle to evaluate the optimality of segment disclosure.19
In delegated portfolio management, there have been proposals to increase the frequency with
which mutual funds are required to disclose their portfolio composition, which in the US is now
six months. The Investment Company Institute (the fund managers’ association) [34] rejects
proposals for increasing the frequency of portfolio disclosure arguing that an increased frequency
risks hurting investors because “[it] would focus undue attention on individual portfolio securities
and could encourage a short-term investment perspective.” The Institute also argues that there
does not seem to be much demand by investors for more information on portfolio holdings. It
is easy to use the framework developed here to back up the Institute’s argument. The action of
a fund manager is his investment strategy. The consequence is return to investors. Returns are
observable but also volatile. In the long term they are a reliable signal of the fund manager’s
quality but in the short term they contain a lot of variance. If the action is observable in the
short term, there is a risk that fund managers will behave in a conformist way, ignoring their
private investment and following the strategy that is a priori a better signal of their competence.
We conclude by pointing to two possible extensions. First, as we argued in the Related
Literature section, there are two ways of modeling cheap talk with career concerns: the expert
model which is used here and the biased advisor model of Morris [22]. It would be interesting to
know to what extent the results presented here carry over to the biased advisor model. Obviously,
in the biased advisor model one must assume that the advisor knows his own type. One can
envision situations in which observing only the consequence induces good advisor to follow their
signals and bad advisors to act in a biased way. When the action is observed as well, good and
bad advisors may pool on the “politically correct” action, which leads to a breakdown of both
discipline and sorting. The question is under what circumstances this situation is more likely to
arise.
Second, this paper has considered action revelation and consequence revelation. We have
allowed for randomization, but we have not allowed for systematic biases. For instance, one
action could be revealed with a higher probability than another action. It would be interesting
to know whether the principal benefits from the introduction of such asymmetric information
19Most existing work in accounting theory predicts that firms should adopt transparency policies, but see Nagar
[23] for a reason why risk averse managers may want to limit disclosure.
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